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21. Introduction
It is widely established in the academic literature that the stock prices of merger targets incur 
abnormal returns before a deal is publicly announced, a  phenomenon called a ‘run-up’ (see 
e.g. Bris, 2005; Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). In this thesis, I analyze the development and 
sources  of  merger  target  run-ups in  the UK public  target  companies  from 1989 to 2018, 
considering especially the effect of insider trading regulation changes. Run-up is an important 
factor  in  the  area  of  mergers  and  acquisitions,  as  previous  studies  have  found  median 
pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns to be  around 4% in the UK, which makes 
around 24% of the full deal premium (Bris, 2005; Madura et al., 2014). My findings of the 
level of run-ups are similar. Run-ups have been found to be an increased cost to the bidder 
(Betton  et  al.,  2008;  Madura  et  al.,  2014;  Schwert,  1996),  so  analyzing  the  reasons  for 
run-ups and possibly finding ways to decrease them is in the interest of acquirers and other 
market players. Also, one source of run-ups is illegal insider trading, so assessing the effects 
of insider trading regulation changes and enforcement gives tools to develop the regulation 
further.
There are two main hypotheses explaining  merger target run-ups. The first one is called  a 
market anticipation hypothesis where investors are able to predict deals based on target and 
deal  characteristics  (Asquith,  1983;  Jensen and  Ruback,  1983),  such  as  rumors,  form of 
payment, and number of advisors. The second one called is  an insider trading hypothesis 
where the run-up reflects private, illegal information  (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). Insider 
trading has been illegal in some form in the US very long, since 1933, but was made illegal in 
the UK only in 1980. Multiple studies have found insider trading laws to reduce run-ups and 
insider  trading  by comparing  run-ups  before  and  after  the  enactment  of  the  first  insider 
trading law in  a  country (Bhattacharya  and Daouk,  2002;  Bris,  2005;  Durnev and Nain, 
2007). There are also studies that analyze  the effect of a singular insider trading regulation 
event on run-ups, such as Bhabra and Hossain (2017) studying Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the US 
and  Prevoo  and  ter  Weel  (2010) studying  Market  Abuse  Directive  in  the  Netherlands. 
However, there are only few studies that analyze run-ups within a single country over time 
taking into account the regulation changes. One of them is Dutordoir et al  (2018) who find 
that each tightening of insider trading regulation has decreased run-ups in the US, and that 
overall, run-ups in the US have drastically decreased from 8.6% in 1980’s to 2.1% in 2010’s.
3London Stock Exchange together with its sub-market London Alternative Investment Market 
has always been one of the largest stock exchanges  with a history dating back to the 16th 
century.  Still,  there  has  been  little  research  on  run-ups  in  the  UK compared  to  the  US. 
Holland and Hodgkinson  (1994) and Barnes  (1996) study the  sources of run-ups with data 
mainly before 1990; Bris  (2005) and Madura et al.  (2014) include the UK only as one of 
many countries in their articles; and Siganos and Papa (2015) study the effect of rumors on 
run-ups. Siganos and Papa  (2015) touch the development of run-ups in their study period 
from 1998 to 2010 and speculate that there would be a decreasing trend, but to my current 
knowledge no paper has looked at the development of the UK run-ups in detail. Neither have 
the changes in the insider trading regulation been considered, even though there have been 
major changes in the regulation since the insider trading was first made illegal in 1980. To fill  
this gap in the literature, the purpose of this paper is first to establish whether there has been a 
decreasing trend in run-ups in the UK from 1989 to 2018, and then to analyze whether the 
market anticipation factors and changes in the insider trading regulation can explain the trend. 
In addition to analyzing the trend, I compare the effects of market anticipation factors to prior 
results from the US market and see whether the same factors affect run-ups in the UK as in 
the US.
My results show that there has been a significant, decreasing trend in run-ups in the UK, 
run-ups decreasing on average by 0.10 percentage points per year. Market anticipation factors 
can  explain  the  decreasing  trend,  although  adding  the  insider  trading  regulation  events 
magnify the effect. Significant market anticipation factors are similar to the ones found in the 
US (Brigida and Madura, 2012; Dutordoir et al., 2018). Hostile deals, active industry, larger 
firm size, and larger mark-ups are correlated with lower run-ups, whereas higher number of 
bidders, whether the target is listed in London Stock Exchange, higher dividend yield, and 
higher  sales  growth  are  correlated  with  higher  run-ups.  I  identify  six  insider  trading 
regulation events within my research period that I hypothesize to have affected the run-ups. 
Of the six events, FSA2012, which created the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), have had 
the  largest  negative  effect  on  run-ups.  Coinciding  with  the time  period  when  FSA2012 
became effective in 2013,  the UK regulator had remarkably more criminal indictments and 
convictions of insider trading than before. This might have increased the effect that FSA2012 
seems to have had. Surprisingly, other identified insider trading regulation events did not 
have  a  clear,  significant  effect  on  run-ups.  One  possible  reason  is  that  as  long  as  the 
4probability of getting caught and the intensity of the law enforcement are low enough, the 
tightness of the regulation is not relevant.
The 30-year sample period of my research is long, and a lot has changed in the society during 
that time. One relevant change that I do not consider in this paper is the development of 
technology. The monitoring systems of regulators have improved to  spot irregular trading 
patterns which could indicate insider trading, and also documentation requirements relating to 
trading activities have increased. So, on one hand, the technological development has made 
the job of regulators easier. On the other hand,  it has given tools to insider traders, too, as 
everyone can  have fast  and  easy  access  to  markets  all  over  the  world  and  secure 
communication channels have been developed. Insider traders time their trades strategically 
to hide the irregularity (see e.g. Ahern, 2018), and on average the one to execute the illegal 
trade is three links away from the source of the information  (Ahern, 2017), which further 
complicates the job of the regulators. It is thus difficult to  speculate what the full effect of 
technological advancement has been on insider trading and run-ups.
This thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on run-ups and potential 
causes behind them. It then discusses the development of insider trading regulation in the UK 
and compares it to the regulation in the US. Section 3 explains the sample selection criteria 
and run-up calculations, after which it analyzes the trend in run-ups in the UK. Section 4 first 
presents market anticipation factors and insider trading regulation events and analyzes  their 
effect with univariate  analysis,  and then analyzes their  combined effect  with multivariate 
analysis. Section 5 discusses the results, limitations of the study, and possible areas for future 
research. Section 6 concludes.
52. Prior literature and background
This section summarizes the prior research on the subject of run-ups. First, I write about the 
sizes of run-ups  in different countries and time periods. Second, I summarize the potential 
impact of run-ups on the deal premium. Third,  I  explore two different hypotheses of the 
source of run-ups starting from market anticipation hypothesis and then moving to insider 
trading hypothesis. Fourth, I describe the development of insider trading regulation in the UK 
over  time,  define  insider  trading,  and  compare  the  UK regulation  to  the  US regulation. 
Finally, I touch the latest development of insider trading enforcement in the UK.
2.1. Target run-up size and impact on deal premium
It  is  established  in  the  academic  literature  that  the  stock  prices  of  merger targets  incur 
abnormal returns before a deal is publicly announced, a phenomenon called a ‘run-up’ (see 
e.g.  Bris,  2005;  Keown  and  Pinkerton,  1981).  The  level  of  run-ups  varies  in  different 
countries and time periods. In the US, Dutordoir et al.  (2018) find the median cumulative 
run-ups to  range between 2.1% and 8.6% from 1985 to 2016, with recent  run-ups being 
lower. In EU-15 countries plus Iceland, Switzerland, and Norway, Madura et al. (2014) find 
median run-ups to range between 0% and 44% from 1997 to 2011. In Canada, King (2009) 
find median run-up to be 6.4% from 1985 to 2002. Regarding emerging markets, Chauhan et 
al. (2014) suggest in their review of run-up literature that more research should be done.
Table 1 summarizes the prior research on the run-ups in the UK. Holland and Hodgkinson 
(1994) are one of the first to study run-ups in the UK. They collect deal and stock data for a 
two-year period, from 1988 to 1989, and find the mean run-up to be 8.8% with announcement 
day return of 15.6%. Barnes (1996) finds the mean run-up to be 19.5% in one month prior to 
the announcement, and announcement day return to be 9.3%, with data from 1987 to 1991. 
Bris (2005) finds the median UK run-up to be 3.92% from 50 days before the announcement 
to one day before, with announcement returns being 16.33%, with data from 1990 to 1999. 
Madura  et  al.  (2014) find  median  UK  run-ups  to  be  4.7%  from  60  days  before  the 
announcement to three days before, with data from 1997 to 2011. Aforementioned papers by 
Madura et al. (2014) and Bris (2005) include other countries than the UK in their analysis as 
well. Siganos and Papa  (2015) find mean run-up to be 11.62%, announcement day return 
being 10.99%, with data from 1998 to 2010. They also notice the average run-up level to 
6have decreased in later years of their sample, although they do not analyze the time trend any 
further. They speculate whether the fines given by FSA to individuals in 2004, which were 
the first fines ever given by FSA, might have had an effect on the run-ups.
I could not find articles analyzing UK run-ups for a full time period that I am using, from 
1989  to  2018,  or  articles  looking  at  a  potential  trend  in  UK  run-ups.  Creating  a 
comprehensive view on run-ups in the UK based on articles presented in Table 1 is  also 
difficult as the articles use different sample selection criteria, run-up periods, and abnormal 
return measures. Finally, the factors that are used to explain the run-up differ from each other.
A partly separate question from the level of the run-up is how it affects the deal premium, that 
is, the sum of pre- and post-announcement period returns. Pre-announcement period returns 
are referred as run-up and post-announcement period returns as mark-up. The effect on the 
deal premium makes the topic important also from a practical point of view, as it is possible 
that higher run-up increases the costs to the bidder. Schwert (1996) formulates two mutually 
exclusive explanations to the relation between the run-up and the premium: the substitution 
hypothesis and the  markup pricing hypothesis. In the substitution hypothesis, the acquirer 
sees the source of the run-up as speculation on the to-be-announced acquisition, and thus 
does not adjust the bid to the higher stock price. In this case the deal premium is independent 
from the run-up. In the markup pricing hypothesis, the acquirer thinks that the run-up reflects  
new  information,  such  as  another  bidder  buying  shares,  or  better  performance  of  the 
company, and thus increases the bid accordingly.  In this  case,  the deal  premium and the 
Table 1: Previous literature of run-ups in the UK
This table lists a sample of papers that have studied UK run-ups in different time periods.  Sample  
period is the time of the study period. N is the number of deals in the study.  Run-up window is the 
period used for calculating run-ups relative to the announcement date. Days refer to trading days.  
Return adjustment is the measure of abnormal returns; MM refers to Market model, and FF3 refers to 
Fama-French three-factor model.  Statistic is the way the run-up measure is  summarized over the 
sample.  Run-up is the value of the run-up in percentages.  Ann. return is the announcement period 
return in percentages.
Paper Sample period N
Run-up 
window
Return 
adjustment Statistic Run-up
Ann. 
return
Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) 1988–1989 86 [-29, -1] MM Mean 8.8 15.6
Barnes (1996) 1987–1991 608 [-30, -1] MM Mean 19.5 7.8
Bris (2005) 1990–1999 290 [-50, -2] MM Median 3.92 16.33
Madura et al. (2014) 1997–2011 248 [-60, -3] MM Median 4.70 -
Siganos and Papa (2015) 1998–2010 783 [-40, -1] FF3 Mean 11.62 10.99
7run-up  are  positively  correlated,  or  in  other  words,  the  run-up  is  independent  from the 
mark-up. Schwert (1996) finds support for the markup pricing hypothesis in the US so that 
the run-ups are an increased cost for the bidder with a ratio of close to one-to-one. Madura et 
al. (2014) come up with similar results with European data.
Schwert  (1996) also considers a possibility where the causality  of the deal premium and 
run-up goes the other way. He proposes that the size of the run-up could be based on the deal  
premium and the probability of the bid succeeding. In this case, a higher run-up would be 
explained by a higher deal premium. This is also why Dutordoir et al.  (2018) use the deal 
premium as an explanatory variable in robustness checks for the run-up; to ensure that the 
decreasing trend in the run-ups is not caused by decreasing deal premiums. Betton et  al. 
(2014) study the subject of deal premiums in more depth. First, they find support for Schwert 
(1996) in that one dollar of additional run-up implies 0.80 dollar of larger mark-up. However, 
by assuming that the run-up is based on signals (rumors) that contain information about the 
synergies of the upcoming deal, they show that although there is correlation between run-up 
and mark-up, the increased mark-up is not an added cost to the bidder, as the high run-up and 
mark-up are both caused by the anticipated high synergies. Second, they find that the target 
run-up is positively correlated with the bidder announcement day returns, which supports the 
assumption that the run-up contains information about the upcoming deal. To sum up, it is 
possible that the run-up is not an added cost to the bidder although the mark-up and the 
run-up are correlated. It should be noted that Betton et al. (2014) do not address the source of 
the takeover signal that causes the run-up.
2.2. Causes for run-ups
What  can  explain  the  run-ups?  Already  in  early  articles,  two  different  explanations  are 
proposed. The first explanation is a  market anticipation hypothesis (Asquith, 1983; Jensen 
and  Ruback,  1983).  Players  in  the  market  are  able  to  identify  possible  targets  based  on 
fundamentals, they hear rumors, or they gain knowledge in other, legal ways. In literature, 
this  hypothesis  has  been  tested  by  creating  merger  anticipation  proxies  based  on  target, 
acquirer,  and  deal  characteristics  and  testing  how  well  they  can  explain  run-ups.  Some 
characteristics have been able to explain some of the run-up, examples of which are rumors 
about the deal, whether the deal is hostile, target size, target profitability, form of payment, 
number of bidders,  and number of advisors  (Brigida and Madura,  2012; Dutordoir  et  al., 
82018; Madura et al.,  2014; Schwert, 1996). Sometimes news articles have been used as a 
proxy for rumors about a deal.  Siganos and Papa  (2015) find that  Financial  Times news 
mentions can explain 27% of run-ups in deals with rumors in the UK, although they do not 
consider other factors. In a related paper, Siganos (2013) compares Financial Times articles to 
Google search volume and finds that Google search volume can explain the run-ups better, 
36% vs 27%, in the UK. However, it can be argued that Google search volume also contains 
illegal insider trading activity or other factors than just rumors. Aspris et al.  (2014) analyze 
Australian market toehold purchases1 taking into account rumors about a deal and find that 
short-term toeholds can explain the size of run-ups almost fully. The finding may explain the 
disagreement  about  the effect  of a  toehold position on run-ups because usually  long and 
short-term toeholds  are  not  separated  in  the  analysis.  Betton  et  al.  (2014) also  find  that 
short-term toeholds increase run-ups, but when analyzing them together with deal mark-ups, 
it  is  not  evident  that  the  higher  run-up  caused  by  higher  toeholds  necessarily  increases 
takeover  costs.  It  should  be  mentioned  that  not  all  market  anticipation  factors  used  in 
previous studies to explain run-ups indicate necessarily legal trading. For example, increased 
number of advisors may lead to both legal trading based on rumors published in media and 
illegal insider trading based on insider information.
Second explanation given for the existence of the run-ups is an  insider trading hypothesis 
(Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). To be precise, insider trading throughout this thesis refers to 
the illegal trading based on insider information and is not limited to the trading of insiders, 
such as CEOs. The insider trading hypothesis says that the run-ups are caused by illegal 
insider trading that increases the demand and thus the stock price before the announcement of 
the deal. As illegal insider trading is by nature hidden, its effects are difficult to study directly. 
Early  evidence  by  Meulbroek  (1992) finds  by  using  data  from  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission (SEC) that almost half of the run-ups are observed on days with insider trading. 
Ahern  (2017) finds by using SEC and Department of Justice data that insider information 
moves usually through social ties based on family, friends, and geographic proximity. On 
average, it  originates from corporate executives and reaches buy-side investors after three 
links in the network. This emphasizes the importance of keeping deal information private, as 
the information  typically moves outside the imminent deal team before it is exploited. He 
also found that returns for insider trades in M&A cases are high, on average 43% in 31 days. 
1Toehold purchases refer to the acquirer buying shares of the target company before the publication of the bid.
9In a related paper, Ahern (2018) finds that insider trading based on long-lived information is 
difficult  to  detect  by  using  measures  of  illiquidity  because  insiders  time  their  trades 
strategically to avoid illiquidity. There is wide support for this type of behavior and it might  
explain  why  catching  insider  traders  is  difficult  based  solely  on  data  about  trading
(Collin-Dufresne  and Fos,  2015;  Kacperczyk and Pagnotta,  2019;  Korczak  et  al.,  2010). 
Interestingly,  Kacperczyk  and Pagnotta  (2018) find  using  SEC insider  trading cases  that 
insider traders react to higher enforcement risk by waiting to trade and splitting their trades 
further,  and  also  concentrate  on  information  of  higher  value.  This  indicates  that  higher 
enforcement risk does reduce insider trading, but insider traders are able to somewhat counter 
the effect by adjusting their behavior.
A more indirect way to separate the effect of illegal insider trading from legal trading based 
on market anticipation is to look at insider trading regulation changes and their effects on the 
run-ups. Laws making insider trading illegal were created in different countries at different 
times, most of them between 1985–2000. Using these dates for 52 countries, Bris  (2005) 
finds that insider trading laws actually increase the profitability of insider trading; however, 
harsher  laws  reduce  the  amount  of  it.  The  reasoning  is  that  if  the  penalties  are  low, 
law-obeying  people  stop  insider  trading  while  the  ones  who  continue  are  hence  able  to 
capture higher profits. Findings from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Bhattacharya and 
Daouk  (2009) support  Bris  (2005),  although  they  add  that  enforcement  of  the  law,  not 
creating of the law, decreases the amount of insider trading, except when the law obedience is 
already high. Durnev and Nain (2007) further support the findings that stricter insider trading 
laws reduce insider  trading.  Bushman et  al.  (2005) show that  the enforcement  of  insider 
trading laws increases analyst following in a country, indicating that the market has become 
fairer. Del Guercio et al. (2017) examine the effect of SEC enforcement on run-ups and find 
that high level of SEC enforcement deters illegal insider trading. Aleksanyan et al.  (2016) 
show that news articles referring to illegal insider trading seem to decrease run-ups. Research 
of specific events also provide evidence that stricter insider trading laws can decrease run-ups 
and  hence  insider  trading.  Market  Abuse  Directive  lowered run-ups  in  Amsterdam stock 
exchange (Prevoo and ter Weel, 2010), Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US (Bhabra and Hossain, 
2017;  Brigida  and  Madura,  2012),  and  tighter  insider  trading  laws  in  Brazil  (Qiu  and 
Balbinotti,  2016).  To  sum  up,  numerous  studies  have  found  support  for  insider  trading 
regulation changes affecting run-ups.
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2.3. Insider trading regulation in the UK
In this section, I provide an overview of the evolution of insider trading regulation in the UK 
and  identify  the  key  events  in  it.  The  key  events  relate  to  both  new  laws  and  to  the 
enforcement of laws, highlighting the importance of enforcement (see Section 2.2). In the 
UK, ‘insider trading’ is usually referred as ‘insider dealing’ and that is why it is used when 
discussing about the UK law. There is no difference in substance between the two terms.
Insider  trading  was  first  made illegal  in  the  UK in  1980 with  the  Companies  Act  1980 
(CA1980) when insider trading became a criminal offense (Alexander, 2001). CA1980 was 
enforced already in 1981 when there were two criminal cases of insider trading  (Barnes, 
2011).  Provisions  outlawing  insider  trading  were  consolidated  in  1985  into  Companies 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (CSIDA1985, effective July 1, 1985), and it was further 
supplemented  by  Financial  Services  Act  1986  (FSA1986,  effective  April  29,  1988)  that 
strengthened  the  government’s  enforcement  powers.  CSIDA1985  was  replaced  by  the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA1993, effective March 1, 1994) which extended the basis of 
liability for the insider dealing offense with a broader definition of ‘securities’ and ‘insider’ 
than CSIDA1985. Current criminal offense of insider dealing is based on CJA1993 with a 
maximum prison sentence of seven years (Alexander, 2001).
Enforcement of insider trading regulation remained weak under the criminal offense defined 
by CJA1993 as  the  criterion  for  criminal  prosecution  was high,  requiring  proof  ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ (Dubow and Monteiro, 2006; Korczak et al., 2010). Also, CJA1993 did not 
generally cover corporations but only natural persons  (Alexander, 2001). To counter these 
problems,  Financial  Services  and  Markets  Act  2000 (FSMA2000,  effective  December  1, 
2001) introduced a civil offense of insider trading with unlimited fines  and a standard of 
proof based on ‘balance of probabilities’2 (Barnes, 2011). In addition to  lower standard of 
proof, civil offenses cannot be punished with a prison sentence, although an insider trader can 
be  prosecuted  for  both  civil  and  criminal  offenses  when  applicable.  Financial  Services 
Authority (FSA) imposed the first civil penalty based on FSMA2000 on February 11, 2004 
2 In the UK, civil offenses include e.g. family disputes, personal injury cases such as road traffic accidents,  
breach of contract, and employment law. Criminal offenses include e.g. burglary, assault, murder and fraud. 
Criminal and civil offenses are not mutually exclusive and people can be prosecuted for both for the same 
incident. For insider trading purposes, the largest differences are that civil offenses cannot bring jail time and the 
difference  in  standard  of  proof.  (https://www.slatergordon.co.uk/media-centre/blog/2018/04/criminal-vs-civil-
law-understanding-the-differences/, visited October 2, 2019)
11
(Dubow and Monteiro, 2006), which means that it took over two years for FSA to prosecute a 
successful civil case. Also, the fines were not high. In the first and second (July 8, 2004) 
successful civil cases, the fines were only £15,000 to the individual3. This did not give a 
strong signal to insider traders in the market and instead may have given them relief. FSA 
gave its first successful criminal sentence only on March 17, 2009 (Goldman et al., 2014), 
although it was not the first criminal sentence for insider trading in general. As discussed in 
more  detail  in  Section  2.4,  the  rate  of  criminal  convictions  for  insider  trading  by  FSA 
increased significantly after the first successful sentence.
Later development of UK insider trading regulation has not been transformational. Financial 
Services  Act  2012  (FSA2012,  effective  April  1,  2013)  divided  FSA into  two  entities, 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), of which 
insider trading cases fall under FCA (Collin, 2013). However, regarding insider trading cases, 
FCA’s capabilities did not significantly increase except for the possibility to publish news 
about ongoing investigations earlier, so called warning notices. This has allowed FCA a better 
negotiating position. FCA also took a strong, active stance against insider trading from its 
inception  (Hitchins,  2015). It  is  possible  that  these  changes  would  affect  the  amount  of 
insider trading but the connection is not obvious.
Some EU-level regulations are relevant to the UK insider trading regulation, although not 
most. First, Market Abuse Directive (MAD, effective July 1, 2005) did not change the UK 
law as the UK was already compliant with the directive (Greene and Schmid, 2013). There 
was a similar situation with the Transparency Directive (TPD, effective January 1, 2007), 
where the UK law did not need to be changed  (Christensen et al., 2016). Finally, the UK 
opted out from Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive (CSMAD, effective July 3, 
2016), which introduced an EU-wide minimum level of criminal sanctions, although the UK 
would have already complied with the required level (Hodges and Lorimer, 2016). However, 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR, effective July 3, 2016), which was introduced at the same 
time as CSMAD, is relevant to the UK. MAR gives regulators more power to monitor insider 
trading and improves  whistle  blowing and insider  lists  (Edmonds,  2016),  and thus could 
diminish insider trading as it increases the probability of getting caught.
3 ‘FSA  fines  headhunter  £15,000  for  market  abuse’,  Independent,  visited  October  2,  2019. 
(https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/fsa-fines-headhunter-acircpound15000-for-market-abuse-
552475.html)
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Based on this analysis, the most significant insider trading regulation events in the UK within 
my  research  period  from  1989  to  2018  are:  CJA1993  (March  1,  1994),  FSMA2000 
(December  1,  2001),  first  enforcement  of  FSMA2000  (February  11,  2004),  first  FSA’s 
enforcement  of criminal  offense of insider  trading (March 27,  2009),  FSA2012 (April  1, 
2013), and MAR (July 3, 2016). I will consider them again in Section 4.2 when I analyze the 
effects of the insider trading regulation events on the run-ups.
2.4. Insider trading definition and regulation in the UK compared to the US
Most of the research in the area of run-ups and insider trading have been done in the US. To 
better position my paper in relation to other papers, in this section I first explain the current 
definition of illegal insider trading in the UK and compare it to the US definition. Then, I  
summarize the overall strictness of the insider trading regulation and the enforcement of the 
regulation in the UK and the US. I finish by looking at the latest development in the UK 
enforcement. Insider trading regulation covers all insider trading and is not limited to mergers 
and acquisitions, although it is a key area in it.
I summarize Greene and Schmid (2013) to explain the current UK insider trading regulation. 
After  the  amendments  introduced  by  FSMA2000,  the  definition  has  not  changed 
significantly. According to FSMA2000, insider dealing occurs when:
an insider deals, or attempts to deal, in a qualifying investment or related investment on the  
basis of insider information related to the investment in question.
For  general  investments,  such  as  ordinary  shares,  insider  information  is  defined  to  be 
information: 
of a precise nature which—(a) is not generally available, (b) relates, directly or indirectly, to 
one  or  more  issuers  of  the  qualifying  investments  or  to  one  or  more  of  the  qualifying 
investments, and (c) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of the qualifying investment or on the price of related investments.
FSMA further provides that information is ‘precise’ if it:
(a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come into existence or 
an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur, and (b) is specific enough 
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to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of those circumstances or that 
event on the price of qualifying investments or related investments.
Under FSMA, an ‘insider’ includes any person who possesses insider information as a result 
of: 
(1)  being part  of  the  administration,  management  or  supervisory bodies  of  an issuer;  (2) 
holding the capital of an issuer (i.e. a share or debenture holder); (3) having access to the 
information through the exercise of his or her employment, profession or duties (including 
outside  counsel,  and  even  contract  cleaners);  (4)  engaging  in  criminal  activities;  or  (5)  
obtaining the information by other means whilst he or she knows, or could reasonably be 
expected to know, that the information is insider information.
When comparing the definition of insider trading in the UK to the one in the US, one of the  
largest  differences  arises  from the  definition  of  insider.  As  explained  above,  in  the  UK, 
insider  includes  everyone  who  possesses  inside  information.  However,  in  the  US,  the 
definition of an insider is based on a fiduciary duty to the company or other source not to 
misuse the information  (Franklin, 2013; Greene and Schmid, 2013). It is said that the UK 
insider trading regulation is about fairness and the US insider trading regulation about theft, 
which describes the difference in defining insider. The difference is seen also when looking at 
the tipper (source of the inside information) and tippee (recipient of the insider information) 
relationship. In the UK, it is not relevant who the tipper is as long as the information ‘is likely 
to have a significant effect on the price of the qualifying investment’. However, in the US, for 
the tippee not being allowed to use the received information, there are three conditions. First, 
there must be some kind of ‘personal benefit’ for the tipper, although this is satisfied by a 
friendly relationship. Second, the tippee knows or should know that there was a breach of 
duty  by  the  tipper  in  disclosing  the  information.  Third,  the  tippee  used  the  tip  to  trade 
securities. Greene and Schmid (2013) give an example where a waitress overhears a CEO in a 
restaurant talking about an upcoming equity offering that will decrease the share price, after 
which  she  trades  on  the  information.  Because the  tipper,  the  CEO,  did  not  tip  her 
intentionally and did not receive a personal benefit, the trading that the waitress did based on 
the information would most likely be legal in the US. However, in the UK, the tipper and 
tippee relationship is not relevant and both parties are evaluated separately, and thus the use 
of inside information by the waitress would be illegal.
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Based on only the definition of the insider trading, the UK regulation is broader than the US. 
However, as Franklin (2013) describes, the history of insider trading regulation, and thus the 
enforcement, in the US goes far, to year 1933, when the Securities Act of 1933 was passed. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established in year 1934, compared to year 
2001 when the UK equivalent FSA was established. This all has led to a stricter attitude 
towards insider trading in the US than in the UK. There are numerous papers that identify the 
ineffectiveness of FSA/FCA prosecutions in the UK due to early settlements, lighter fines and 
often no jail time (Barnes, 2011; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bris, 2005; Coffee, 2007; 
Franklin,  2013;  Ventoruzzo,  2015).  Coffee  (2007) presents  statistics that  compare  the 
difference in the insider trading regulation enforcement between the US and the UK from 
2001 to 2006. SEC brought over 300 insider trading enforcement actions against over 600 
individuals, which makes about 50 actions per year. In addition, Department of Justice had 
more than 50 actions per year. This compares to the FSA’s record of eight cases within the 
same period, which is a magnitude lower than the US comparable. The average fines in the 
UK were also lower than in the US.
Although the insider trading regulation in the UK covers the necessary actions to prohibit 
insider trading, the enforcement has not been very strong. However, in recent years, there 
have been more criminal actions of insider dealing pursued by FCA than before. Table 2 
summarizes the number of criminal indictments and convictions of insider dealing. The data 
is from Hinton and Patton (2011) and McHugh (2018). Before 2008/094 there were only two 
indictments and one conviction. In 2009/10, the total increased to 12 indictments and five 
convictions. Year 2010/11 saw 14 indictments which is the record. In 2012/13, there were 
record  high  12  convictions.  From April  2013  to  September  2017,  the  yearly  number  of 
4 FSA/FCA financial year lasts from April 1 to March 31.
Table 2: FSA/FCA criminal indictments and convictions of insider dealing 2002–2018 
The data is from Hinton and Patton (2011) and McHugh (2018). They have collected the data from 
FSA/FCA press releases supplemented by a review of news articles. Indictments are allocated to  
years based on the date of indictment, whereas convictions are allocated based on the date of verdict. 
FSA/FCA financial year lasts from April 1 to March 31. Number for 17/18 contains only first half of  
the financial year, which is indicated by an asterisk (*). The table includes only named defendants.
< 08/09 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 17/18* Total
Indictments 2 3 7 14 4 8 1 3 3 1 2 48
Convictions 1 3 1 5 1 12 1 3 1 5 0 33
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indictments  was  around  two  and  convictions  around  three.  The  difference  between  the 
periods before and after 2008/09 is large. The record year for convictions, 2012/13, is right 
before FSA2012 became effective and FCA was established, which may strengthen the effect 
of FSA2012 in the analysis in this paper.
3. Sample construction and target run-ups
In this section, I first define my sample and explain the sample selection criteria, which are 
borrowed  from  previous literature.  Then,  I  explain  the  abnormal  return  and  run-up 
calculations. Finally, I analyze the trend in run-ups and deal premiums in my research period.
3.1. Data and sample construction
My sample of deals consists of mergers and acquisitions between 1989 and 2018 where the 
target is a UK firm listed in London Stock Exchange (LSE) or London Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) and the deal is for a majority share of target’s equity. I use SDC Platinum 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database for M&A and deal specific data, and Thompson Financial 
Datastream  for  stock  price  data.  I  fetch  fundamental  data  from  Worldscope  through 
Datastream. The initial sample size from SDC is 4,643 deals. After removing targets without 
a Datastream code and selecting only the first bid per target, the sample size decreases to 
3,335 deals. After applying all of the data selection criteria presented below, the sample size 
ends up to  697. To arrive at  the final  sample,  I  use similar  criteria  to existing literature, 
mainly Brigida and Madura (2012), Madura et al. (2014), and Dutordoir et al. (2018):
 I include deals that are announced between 1989 and 2018. Year 1985 would be the 
first  to  have  international  M&A data  in  SDC; however,  the  coverage  of  the  deal 
information for UK deals is poor for the first few years. Year 1988 is the first one to 
have accurate dividend payment dates in Datastream for firms listed in the UK, and 
one year of accurate return data is required for market model calculation of returns, 
and hence 1989 is the first year to be used.
 The field ‘Original Date Announced’ (ODA)  in SDC is used as the announcement 
date of the deal for the run-up calculations and sample selection purposes as Mulherin 
and Simsir (2015) suggest. They also find that in the US, many deals that should have 
ODA, do not have it, and thus the announcement date may sometimes be inaccurate 
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even when using ODA. Regardless, ODA is more accurate than ‘Date Announced’ 
(DA), as ODA is the date when ‘…the target company is first publicly disclosed as a 
possible takeover candidate.’ The events that trigger ODA include rumors published in 
newspapers,  publication  of  other  bids,  ‘seeking  for  buyer’  announcements,  and 
disclosure of acquisition plans by the merging parties without any confirmed details. I 
manually checked a few cases where the ODA and DA differ, and they confirmed the 
better accuracy of ODA. In total, ODA is different from DA in 254 bids from the total 
sample of 697. Deals with the flag ‘Date Announced is Estimated’ are excluded.
 I  include  successful  and unsuccessful  initial  bids  that  would  end up the  acquirer 
owning a  majority  share  of  the  target’s  equity  (SDC Deal  Forms ‘Acquisition  of 
Majority Interest’ and ‘Merger’). I also require the deal to be for more than 50% of 
equity, excluding deals where the acquirer has a significant ownership in the target 
before the bid5. Deals with a status of ‘Seeking Buyer’ and ‘Rumor’ are excluded. If 
there are multiple bids for the target at the same announcement date, the one to be 
completed is selected for deal specific information purposes. If no bid will succeed, I 
select the one with more accurate data, which is a case for only a couple of bids. 
 There should be at  least  42 trading days of full stock price data with at least  one 
non-zero return for the target before the announcement date, and at least 50% of daily 
stock return data from trading days -255 to -43 relative to the announcement date. I 
consider  a  day  to  be  a  trading  day  if  the  FTSE  All  Share  Index  fetched  from 
Datastream has a value on that day. If the announcement day falls to weekend or other 
non-trading day, next trading day is used as the announcement day.
 Following Ince and Porter (2006), daily stock returns are calculated manually as the 
percentage change in the sum of price (P) and dividend (DDE) from one day to the 
next day. Also, based on their suggestion, targets with stock prices below one pence6 
at the announcement date are excluded. These measures mitigate problems in the way 
Datastream calculates the total return (TR) item.
 I exclude deals with a deal premium less than 5%, as no informed trader would risk 
being caught for such a small profit (Madura et al., 2014). For this purpose, the deal 
5 For example, if the acquirer had a 30% ownership in the target prior to the bid, and the bid would increase the  
ownership to 60%, the deal would fulfill  the first condition (‘Acquisition of Majority Interest’), but not the  
second (‘deal to be for more than 50% equity’).
6 Stock prices are quoted in pence (£0.01) in London Stock Exchange.
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premium is calculated as a sum of abnormal returns at days 0 and +1 relative to the 
announcement date. In addition,  I exclude deals which have days within the main 
run-up  period  [-42,  -1]  with  abnormal  returns  higher  (lower)  than  20%  (-20%) 
(Prevoo and ter Weel, 2010). These types of abnormal returns indicate other corporate 
events in the run-up period and would thus obscure the run-up measure. These both 
exclusions also help to diminish possible errors in the announcement dates fetched 
from SDC.
 To tackle the possible problem of outliers in the data, I winsorize target run-ups and 
all continuous variables at the 5% and 95% levels.
 Deals with missing values for deal and merger anticipation proxies are excluded. I 
require the accounting currency reported in Worldscope to be in GBP (£). Utilities 
(SIC 49XX) are excluded from the sample due to specialties in their accounting data.
 Inflation-corrected (base year  2015) market  value and deal  value of the target  are 
required to be at  least £1 million.  I use a UK consumer price index fetched from 
OECD. 
My final sample consists of 697 deals. Table 3 contains some descriptive statistics of the 
sample. Further information of the variables is presented later in the thesis and in Appendix. 
Deal and firm values are inflation corrected based on consumer price index data from OECD. 
Table 3: Descriptive sample statistics
This table summarizes the sample characteristics. The sample consists of initial merger bids for a  
majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 2018 where the target is a UK firm listed in 
London  Stock  Exchange  (LSE)  or  London  Alternative  Investment  Market  (AIM).  After  sample 
selection criteria, there are 697 initial bids in the sample. Sample selection is explained in Section 3.1 
in detail. Deal value is from SDC. Firm value is the market value of the target 12 weeks before the 
announcement of the bid.  Run-up is the market model estimated cumulative abnormal return in the 
period [-42, -1] relative to the announcement date, in percentages. Mark-up, 1d is the stock price of 
the target  firm at  day +1 relative to the announcement date divided by the stock price at  day -1 
relative to the announcement date. Premium, 8w is the stock price of the target firm at day +1 relative 
to the announcement date divided by the stock price at day -42 relative to the announcement date. All 
days are trading days. Further explanation of variables is in Appendix.
Statistic Min Pctl(25) Mean Median Pctl(75) Max St. Dev. N
Deal value (£ million) 1.6 41.8 797.4 121.9 457.6 46,698.3 2,800.0 697
Firm value (£ million) 1.6 29.5 550.0 79.4 305.0 28,111.5 1,801.4 697
Run-up [-42, -1] (%) -11.2 -1.8 5.6 4.1 12.6 26.9 10.4 697
Mark-up, 1d (%) 9.0 16.7 30.3 26.3 38.9 75.3 17.5 697
Premium, 8w (%) 10.4 21.7 37.5 33.5 48.7 85.3 20.3 697
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The base year is 2015. Later in the univariate and multivariate analysis, I take a natural log of 
firm value, but here they are only inflation-adjusted. The median deal size is £122 million 
with the maximum deal size being £47 billion. Most of the deals are in the small end, as 75% 
of the deals fall under £458 million, which is smaller than the mean deal value. Target market 
values measured at 12 weeks before the ODA (firm value) follow similar pattern, median 
market value being £79 million. Run-ups, mark-ups, and premiums are discussed in more 
detail in the following section.
3.2. Run-up calculations and trend in run-ups
The  target  run-up measure  is  calculated  as  a  cumulative  sum of  market  model  adjusted 
abnormal stock returns, following standard methods (e.g. Dutordoir et al., 2018). The market 
model regression is estimated over a period of -255 days to -70 days relative to the deal 
announcement date. I use FTSE All Share index as a market portfolio. More formally, the 
market model regression is
Rit=αi+β iRmt+ε it , (1)
where  Rit is the daily stock return for the target firm  i,  Rmt is the market return, and the 
residual  ε it is  the  abnormal  return.  First,  I  calculate  the  parameters  α i  and β i  over  the 
estimation period. Then, I calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as a cumulative 
sum of abnormal returns, calculated using the estimated parameters, within the run-up period. 
My main target run-up measure is CAR over 42 trading days before the ODA. The formula is
CAR=∑
t=− 42
− 1
εit . (2)
Commonly used starting days for the run-up period range from -20 to -60. I consider them in 
Table 4, and explain the use of 42 days in the following paragraph.
Table 4 shows how the sample is distributed and how the different run-up measures have 
developed over time. At the bottom of the table, means and medians are shown for the full 
period. Number of deals range from two in 1990 to tech bubble highs 84 in 1999, average 
being 23 per year. The first two years have only a few bids, and there is considerable variance 
in the number of bids per year also in later years, such as eight bids in 2013. Following 
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columns show different run-up measures over time. Looking at the whole period, means are 
generally larger than medians, and longer run-up windows produce higher run-ups.
When  deciding  about  which  run-up period  to  use,  it  is  important  to  use  a  long  enough 
window to capture all of the run-up while minimizing the amount of noise within the period 
(Schwert, 1996). The period I use, and that many others have used before, [-42, -1], is a good 
compromise in this regard with a median run-up of 4.14%. For a shorter window, [-20, -1], 
the median run-up would be considerably smaller, 2.56%, and for a longer window, [-60, -1], 
only a tiny bit larger, 4.80%. Figure 1 visualizes the way the abnormal returns accumulate by 
showing a median daily CAR with 25th and 75th percentile values from 60 days before to five 
days after the bid announcement date. There is little movement in the median price until 42 
days before the announcement date, and most of the abnormal returns start to accumulate 30 
days before the announcement date. There are many targets with negative run-ups, and also 
many targets with large run-ups. My findings about the level of the run-up are consistent with 
the previous literature presented in Table 1, such as Madura et al. (2014) who find the median 
UK run-up to be 4.7% in a window of [-60, -3] between 1997 and 2011.
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Figure 1: Median daily CAR with interquartile range before the bid announcement date
CAR is market model estimated cumulative abnormal return. The sample consists of initial merger 
bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 2018 where the target is a UK firm listed 
in London Stock Exchange (LSE) or London Alternative Investment Market  (AIM).  All  days are 
trading days. Dotted red line highlights the last day before the announcement of the bid, i.e. the day  
-1.
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Table 4: UK run-ups and deal premiums 1989–2018
The sample consists of initial merger bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 
2018 where the target is a UK firm listed in London Stock Exchange (LSE) or London Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM). Initial merger bids are divided into years based on their announcement  
dates (ODA). Days in the square brackets refer to trading days relative to the announcement date.  
Values in the table are market model estimated CARs calculated with the respective brackets. N is the 
number of initial merger bids within the year. Mean is the mean of the variable within the year, Med. 
is the median of the variable within the year. [-60, -1], [-42, -1], and [-20, -1] are run-up measures. 
[0,  +1] is  a  post-announcement  period  return  (mark-up).  [-42,  +1] is  a  full  deal  period  return.
[-42, -1] / [-42, +1] is a run-up index, that is, a share of the full deal period return that is accountable 
to the run-up. Bottom part of the table shows values for the full time period. Trend is the coefficient 
of Trend from the regression CAR y ,i=αi+β i×Trend, where y is year. p-value is the significance of 
β. All values are in percentages (1% = 1).
CAR
[-60, -1]  [-42, -1] [-20, -1] [0, +1] [-42, +1] [-42, -1] /[-42, +1]
Year N Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med.
1989 4 9.0 8.5 9.6 11.1 3.7 3.0 18.4 17.4 27.9 30.5 26.2 35.3
1990 2 13.6 13.6 15.6 15.6 7.3 7.3 25.7 25.7 41.3 41.3 38.1 38.1
1991 8 11.4 9.7 12.6 9.2 7.0 8.0 22.8 22.4 37.2 36.4 32.4 25.3
1992 13 7.4 4.6 7.0 8.1 5.5 5.4 21.4 18.4 29.7 30.0 21.4 27.1
1993 7 1.4 0.1 -1.4 -3.2 0.7 -1.1 31.6 38.8 33.2 36.2 -8.7 -7.4
1994 7 3.6 2.2 0.4 2.9 0.8 2.0 24.6 24.1 24.1 16.7 -14.6 8.7
1995 18 7.8 5.6 5.4 3.1 3.3 0.8 23.1 22.0 28.3 22.4 8.8 13.4
1996 19 -0.5 -6.2 1.7 -1.6 0.5 -1.3 26.3 24.5 27.7 29.1 -12.3 -5.3
1997 37 6.0 7.5 4.0 4.5 1.7 1.4 24.4 21.9 28.2 23.5 5.4 16.9
1998 60 5.1 3.9 5.2 4.7 3.6 2.4 21.1 17.4 25.7 22.9 10.6 21.2
1999 84 10.9 11.0 9.3 7.9 6.2 6.3 20.3 17.9 30.5 28.3 24.6 34.7
2000 77 5.8 4.4 5.5 3.8 4.4 3.9 19.7 17.6 25.7 23.5 9.4 20.6
2001 20 4.9 4.5 4.9 4.8 3.2 2.9 16.9 13.1 21.9 21.5 17.4 18.7
2002 23 0.9 0.2 1.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 17.4 16.9 19.4 19.1 -3.0 12.0
2003 26 8.2 3.6 6.0 5.1 5.9 4.7 16.4 14.3 22.4 19.4 22.5 23.4
2004 23 3.5 0.7 3.6 1.1 2.6 2.1 23.6 22.8 27.4 27.0 8.6 8.5
2005 33 11.6 11.0 9.3 7.5 4.5 2.2 13.9 12.2 23.4 23.6 28.5 33.1
2006 26 9.4 6.6 8.3 6.3 4.4 2.7 12.6 11.8 20.9 18.7 31.7 40.4
2007 30 3.9 3.7 3.4 1.4 1.7 1.1 20.4 18.3 23.7 20.9 -0.9 8.4
2008 21 5.7 7.9 6.0 7.8 3.8 1.5 27.2 28.6 32.5 30.7 15.6 30.9
2009 12 5.0 3.6 4.8 6.2 4.6 4.5 20.9 18.4 27.0 22.2 14.4 23.3
2010 19 7.4 7.6 7.1 5.1 3.1 -0.5 30.9 29.3 39.9 45.4 6.7 10.1
2011 17 4.3 2.3 4.6 0.4 1.8 -1.2 27.1 23.8 31.1 24.2 4.2 1.8
2012 16 11.7 13.9 8.6 7.7 5.0 3.7 22.7 24.7 31.9 31.8 23.1 27.3
2013 8 8.2 10.4 5.1 4.8 5.8 4.0 21.9 22.0 26.9 22.0 11.9 16.2
2014 12 -1.3 -0.3 1.0 -0.3 1.6 1.3 20.4 16.9 22.5 21.7 0.4 1.8
2015 24 5.2 3.0 3.8 1.9 1.8 0.6 20.0 18.1 23.8 21.8 9.9 12.2
2016 21 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.0 3.7 1.6 22.2 20.2 25.0 24.7 3.9 9.6
2017 12 1.3 1.5 3.0 3.1 5.0 5.4 20.8 16.8 23.6 25.1 1.6 12.0
2018 18 4.9 4.7 3.1 0.3 2.5 -0.00 22.4 22.2 26.6 21.6 7.4 1.1
1989–2018 697 6.23 4.80 5.58 4.14 3.77 2.56 21.00 18.12 26.84 23.75 12.25 17.42
Trend -0.13 -0.06 -0.13 -0.17 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.19 -0.23 -0.28 -0.40
p-value 0.12 0.56 0.09 0.04 0.56 0.14 0.61 0.43 0.10 0.12 0.32 0.14
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Under the full period means and medians in Table 4, yearly run-ups are regressed to a yearly 
time  trend.  Trend is  the  coefficient  of  the  trend,  and  p-value  is  the  significance  of  the 
coefficient. The time trend is negative for all run-up measures, although significant at the 5% 
level only for the median of CAR [-42, -1].  Siganos and Papa  (2015) note that  the FF3 
adjusted run-ups ([-60, -1]) in the UK would have decreased between 1998 and 2010. In 
unreported tests, I do not find a significant time trend for this period with market model 
adjusted returns. Figure 2 plots all the initial bids in my sample based on their announcement 
date and run-up. In addition, a median yearly run-up with an interquartile range and a number 
of bids are shown. There is a sharp decline in the median run-up after 1992, after which the 
level starts to fluctuate around 4%. The level has stayed low after 2013. It should be noted 
that there are only a few initial bids between 1989 and 1994, which decreases the accuracy of 
the first years in the sample. The figure clearly shows the effect of winsorizing the run-ups 
with the row of bids in the top and bottom of the figure.
In Table 4, the deal mark-ups measured as CAR [0, +1] have varied between 11.8% and 
38.8%,  a  median  of  the  whole  period  being 18.12%. There  is  no significant  time trend. 
Looking at the full deal premiums, CAR [-42, +1], the median is 23.75%. The time trend for 
the mean is significant at the 10% level with a negative coefficient, the median also having a 
negative coefficient, although not significant. So, it seems that the full period returns have 
decreased over time as well as the run-up returns. As the mark-up has stayed relatively stable, 
it seems that the decrease in run-ups has been the reason for the decline in the deal premiums. 
To analyze this relation further,  in the two final columns a run-up index which was first 
introduced by Schwert (1996) is shown. It shows a share of the full deal period return that is 
accountable to the run-up. The level has varied a lot over the sample period, median being 
17.42%. Run-up has been over 30% of the full period return in multiple years, being the 
highest, 40.4%, in 2006. The time trend is negative, but as it is not significant, it cannot be 
concluded that the share of run-ups of full period returns would have decreased. However, the 
run-up index shows well how major issue the pre-announcement run-up is. Previous studies 
(Madura et  al.,  2014; Schwert,  1996) have found that the run-up is an added cost to the 
bidder, and the high levels of run-up index emphasize the importance of this point.
As presented earlier in Section 2.1, Schwert (1996) proposes a theory that the run-up might 
be caused by the size of the deal premium and the probability of the deal being successful. If 
the hypothesis was true, run-ups and mark-ups would correlate with each other by moving in 
22
the same direction, as both are caused by high deal premiums. Also, run-up index would stay 
on average at the same level despite the absolute level of run-up, that is,  run-up index and 
run-ups would not correlate with each other, assuming that the probability of the deal being 
successful stayed constant.  Looking at  the time trend, it  would seem that the run-up and 
mark-up have moved in the same direction, as both have decreased. However, their pairwise 
correlation is negative, -0.27 (unreported), which is not what the hypothesis would predict. 
For run-up index, the time trend is not significant, although the coefficient is negative. The 
pairwise  correlation  with  the  run-up  is  0.86  (unreported),  which  again  is  not  what  the 
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Figure 2: Median run-up by year with interquartile range and all initial bids
The sample consists of initial merger bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 
2018 where the target is a UK firm listed in London Stock Exchange (LSE) or London Alternative  
Investment Market (AIM). Run-up is the market model estimated cumulative abnormal return in the 
period [-42, -1] relative to the announcement date. The line represents the median run-up within the 
calendar year based on the announcement dates of the initial bids. The shaded grey area shows the 25 th 
and  75th percentile  values.  Dots  represent  initial  bids  which  are  plotted  continuously  by  their 
announcement date. Run-ups are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels.
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hypothesis  would  predict.  So,  it  seems  that  deal  premiums  are  not  driving  the  level  of 
run-ups.
This analysis shows that there are run-ups in UK deals, and that the level of the run-ups has 
decreased  from  1989  to  2018.  Also,  the  full  deal  premiums  have  decreased  while  the 
mark-ups do not have a significant trend. The run-up index has a negative time trend that is  
not significant, so it cannot be concluded that the share of run-ups of the full period returns 
have decreased. Finally, based on the time trends and correlations between run-ups, mark-ups 
and full deal premiums, the deal premiums are not driving the level of run-ups. In the next 
section, I present other potential explanations for the run-up and the trend.
4. Univariate and multivariate analysis of factors affecting run-ups
This section first presents the market anticipation factors based on  previous literature and 
then analyzes their effect on the run-ups in the univariate analysis. Then, the section presents 
the insider trading regulation events and analyzes their effect on the run-ups in the univariate 
analysis.  Finally,  the section  studies the effects  of market anticipation factors and insider 
trading regulation events together in multivariate analysis and considers whether they can 
explain the trend in the run-ups.
4.1. Market anticipation factors
To analyze  the effect of market anticipation factors to  the level of run-ups, I use following 
factors adapted from Dutordoir et al.  (2018), Brigida and Madura (2012), and Madura et al. 
(2014). All factors and sources of their data are explained in Appendix.
First, I present the deal and acquirer characteristics that might affect the run-ups:
 Rumor:  A dummy variable equal to one if there have been rumors about the deal 
before its announcement. The effect is expected to be positive. The rumors may arise 
from the run-up itself, which would indicate reverse causality. However, it is more 
likely that the rumor is based on leaked information, and trading based on rumors 
published in newspapers or similar media is legal in the UK. It should also be noted 
that the variable will overstate the effect of rumors as the sample contains only bids 
that are later confirmed and not the ones which remained as rumors.
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 Toehold: A dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer  owns a stake in the target 
before the announcement of the bid. Acquiring a toehold position signals the market 
about  a potential  takeover which would increase the run-up  (Brigida and Madura, 
2012). However, Aspris et al.  (2014) finds that only short-term, and not long-term, 
toeholds predict a run-up. I am not able to separate between the two with my dataset.
 Cash  financing:  The  percentage  of  cash  compensation  of  the  total  compensation. 
Cash-financed deals are more anticipated as they often require raising debt. Even if no 
debt is raised, collecting or saving cash in other ways could be noticed, although the 
effect on the run-up would be questionable. Dutordoir et al.  (2018) and Brigida and 
Madura (2012) find support for this hypothesis.
 Deal completed: A dummy variable equal to one if the deal is eventually completed, 
regardless of whether the winning bid is the first bid published. Completed bids are 
more likely to incur a run-up as the eventual payoff for pre-announcement trading is 
on average higher than in the bids that do not materialize.
 Hostile: A dummy variable equal to one if the deal is hostile. Hostile deals are thought 
to be more surprising because the hostile acquirer does not want the target to have 
time to prepare a defense for the bid, compared to a friendly bid, which can involve 
long negotiations before the public announcement of the bid. The effect on the run-up 
is thus expected to be negative, as the information is less likely to leak before the 
announcement of the bid. Dutordoir et al. (2018) does not find hostile deals to have a 
statistically significant effect.
 Poison  pill:  This  is  also  known as  a  shareholder  rights  plan,  which  is  a  type  of 
defensive tactic against a takeover. Although Dutordoir et al.  (2018) and other US 
studies propose  this  variable,  it  is  not  relevant  in the  UK as  poison pills  are  not 
allowed by the Takeover Code. Targets with poison pill takeover defense would be 
expected to be less likely to become targets.
 Number of bidders: The information about the deal is more likely to leak when there 
are many bidders. In addition, competing toeholds may increase the stock price of the 
target. Dutordoir et al. (2018) find support for this hypothesis.
 Active  industry:  A dummy  variable  equal  to  one  if  there  has  been  at  least  one 
acquisition in target’s four-number SIC industry during the year prior to the deal. Bid 
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is more anticipated if a competitor has received a bid earlier. Dutordoir et al.  (2018) 
do not find this variable significant.
 Foreign: A dummy variable equal to one if the ultimate parent of the acquirer is not 
from the UK. A foreign bidder may be more likely to leak information about the deal 
as it is more difficult to be identified by the UK officials. Also, a foreign bidder may 
need many advisors  in  multiple  areas  regarding the bid and thus it  may be more 
difficult to hide its intentions. On the other hand, as a foreign bidder is located further 
away, the bid can be more of a surprise to the market. The effect on the run-up can 
thus be either positive or negative. Brigida and Madura (2012) find that the effect of 
foreign bidders is positive on the run-up.
 Public: A dummy variable equal to one if the ultimate parent of the acquirer is listed 
in a stock exchange. Public firms are followed more actively which would make it 
easier to  predict a bid.  However, public firms have more rigorous takeover policies 
and they may use better advisors than private firms, and thus they are better in hiding 
their intentions. In the US, Officer et al. (2010) find that public acquirers incur smaller 
run-ups; however, Bargeron et al. (2008) do not find a significant difference.
 LBO: A dummy variable equal to one if the deal is considered as an LBO deal. LBOs 
require raising debt which would spread the information, but to  counter that, LBO 
firms are regular acquirers and their takeover policies should be advanced. Officer et 
al. (2010) find lower run-ups for LBOs in the US.
 Number of target advisors: Total number of target advisors, including financial and 
legal advisors. Based on Dai et al.  (2017), higher number of advisors is expected to 
lead to higher run-up due to higher probability of information leaks, both intentional 
and accidental. 
 Number of acquirer advisors: Same reasoning as target advisors, although Dai et al. 
(2017) did not find support for acquirer advisors having an effect on the run-up.
Table 5 divides the sample by market anticipation factors and shows a univariate analysis of 
the run-up. Continuous variables are divided into two groups by their median value, where 0 
means ‘low’ (below median) and 1 means ‘high’ (above median) group. Means (medians) of 
the run-up with p-values from t-test (Wilcoxon test) are shown together with the number of 
occurrences. Panel A shows the results for the deal and acquirer characteristics. Hostile and 
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Number of bidders are the only ones to be significant, and they are at the 10% level. Run-up 
is about three percentage points lower for hostile deals. This is in line with the hypothesis that 
the acquirer  is able  to keep the bid secret, and thus the information does not leak to the 
market. Higher number of bidders predict a higher run-up, which supports the hypothesis that 
information is more likely to leak when there are more bidders. Another explanation is that 
the bidders start to accumulate shares in the target already before their bid, which also would 
increase the run-up. Of 71 number of bidders above the median,  62 include two bidders 
Table 5: Target run-ups by market anticipation factors
The sample consists of initial merger bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 
2018  where  the  target  is  a  UK  firm  listed  in  London  Stock  Exchange  or  London  Alternative 
Investment Market. Run-up is the market model estimated cumulative abnormal return in the period 
[-42, -1] relative to the announcement date,  in percentages.  Variables are explained in Appendix.  
Panel A contains the deal and acquirer characteristics and Panel B the target characteristics. For each 
variable, the sample is divided into two groups. Dummy variables are divided based on their value  
(0/1) whereas continuous variables are divided to low (0) and high (1) groups based on their median  
value. diff is the difference between the mean/median run-ups of the two groups. t-test and Wilcoxon 
columns contain the p-value from the corresponding tests of the significance of the difference. Last 
two columns (N) show the distribution of initial bids based on the two groups. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Run-up, CAR [-42, -1] Mean Median N
0 1 diff t-test 0 1 diff Wilcoxon 0 1
Panel A: Deal and acquirer characteristics
Active industry 6.07 4.82 -1.25 0.12 4.45 3.49 -0.96 0.13 421 276
Foreign 5.27 5.81 0.53 0.51 3.18 4.42 1.24 0.38 301 396
Public 5.32 5.72 0.40 0.63 4.41 4.11 -0.31 0.70 250 447
Cash financing 5.64 5.56 -0.08 0.93 4.48 4.00 -0.48 0.82 156 541
Deal completed 6.21 5.48 -0.73 0.52 4.22 4.12 -0.09 0.48 91 606
Hostile 5.79 3.62 -2.17 0.07* 4.45 1.44 -3.02 0.10* 627 70
LBO 5.61 5.39 -0.23 0.83 3.89 5.20 1.31 0.98 585 112
Number of bidders 5.33 7.73 2.39 0.08* 4.02 6.34 2.32 0.09* 626 71
No. of acquirer advisors 5.75 5.43 -0.32 0.68 3.89 4.41 0.52 0.80 323 374
No. of target advisors 4.87 5.74 0.88 0.38 3.17 4.42 1.24 0.42 132 565
Rumored 5.46 6.01 0.55 0.56 3.80 4.76 0.96 0.49 545 152
Toehold 5.36 6.55 1.19 0.27 4.16 3.90 -0.26 0.41 569 128
Panel B: Target characteristics
Dividend yield 4.78 6.37 1.58 0.04** 3.16 5.02 1.86 0.04** 348 349
GR dummy 5.36 6.11 0.75 0.39 3.61 4.89 1.28 0.32 494 203
Leverage 5.67 5.48 -0.18 0.81 3.39 4.49 1.10 0.86 348 349
Liquidity 6.11 5.04 -1.07 0.18 4.44 3.58 -0.86 0.16 348 349
LSE 4.18 5.84 1.66 0.13 2.78 4.49 1.71 0.10* 110 587
Market-to-book 5.76 5.40 -0.36 0.65 4.05 4.38 0.33 0.59 347 350
Sales growth 5.01 6.14 1.13 0.15 3.17 4.93 1.77 0.19 348 349
Firm value 6.10 5.06 -1.04 0.19 4.72 3.52 -1.20 0.21 348 349
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(unreported).  Unlike  Officer  et  al.  (2010),  LBO and  Public variables  are  not  significant. 
Another difference to the findings of the previous studies is that the variable Rumored does 
not predict a higher run-up. This is most likely due to my use of ODA instead of DA, and it 
also highlights the importance of using the correct bid announcement date. Compared to other 
comprehensive run-up studies such as Dutordoir  et  al.  (2018),  Madura et  al.  (2014),  and 
Brigida and Madura (2012), the findings from the deal and acquirer specific univariate tests 
are largely similar, also since not many variables are significant.
In  addition  to  deal  and  acquirer  characteristics,  some  target  characteristics  have  been 
identified to predict a merger. All of the factors below are borrowed from Dutordoir et al. 
(2018), except LSE:
 Market-to-book: Low market-to-book ratio indicates that the target is cheap or that it 
has low growth opportunities and would thus gain from acquisition. Lower values 
would lead to a higher run-up.
 Dividend  yield:  High  values  indicate  fewer  investment  opportunities  and  higher 
agency costs, which both would predict a possible merger.
 Sales growth: High sales growth firms are less likely to be acquired as their business 
is doing well.
 GR dummy:  Growth-resource mismatch. A dummy variable equal to one for firms 
with high sales growth, low liquidity, and high leverage, or vice versa. Sales growth, 
liquidity,  and  leverage  are  explained  in  separate  bullets.  Targets  with  the  GR 
mismatch are more likely to be taken over as they are in an unbalanced state. Either 
they are growing and they lack resources, or they are not growing and they have spare 
resources.
 Leverage: Measured as debt to total assets. Highly leveraged firms are less likely to 
be acquired.
 Liquidity: Measured as cash and equivalent to total assets. Opposite to leverage, high 
liquidity firms are more likely to be acquired.
 Firm value: Natural logarithm of the inflation corrected market value of the target 
firm. Smaller firms are more likely to be acquired.
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 LSE: A dummy variable equal to one for firms listed in the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) in contrast to London Alternative Investment Market (AIM). I speculate that 
firms in AIM are monitored by fewer investors and thus information would be easier 
to  be kept private. On the other hand, firms listed in LSE are under more rigorous 
oversight by regulation, which would tighten the information handling. 
Panel  B  in Table  5  shows the  results  for  the  target  characteristics.  Dividend  yield is 
significant, and the effect is positive to run-up. This finding is in line with previous studies. 
Targets  listed  in  LSE  incur  higher  run-ups  than  those  in  AIM.  Other  variables  are  not 
significant, which is not a big surprise, as the link between fundamental firm data and the 
run-up is only weak. The fundamental data is from the last full financial  year before the 
acquisition, and the run-up period is eight calendar weeks before the announcement. So even 
though  these  factors  have  been  found  to  being  able  to  predict  mergers  (Espahbodi  and 
Espahbodi, 2003; Palepu, 1986), it is unlikely that the increase in stock price would be timed 
within  the  run-up period.  However,  it  is  more sensible  that  factors  describing the  target, 
acquirer, or the deal would explain the run-up, as they are relevant to the way information 
might leak and always relative to the deal announcement date.
4.2. Insider trading regulation events
If  the  insider  trading  hypothesis  is  true,  tighter  insider  trading  regulation  and  higher 
enforcement are expected to reduce insider trading and thus run-ups. Based on the analysis in 
Section 2.3,  I  consider following events to be significant insider trading regulation (ITR) 
events within my research period from 1989 to 2018:
 CJA1993: Effective March 1, 1994. Although insider trading was criminalized before, 
this law extended the basis of liability for the insider trading offense and is also the 
present criminal law. A person should be more unlikely to insider trade when he or she 
is more likely to be convicted. However, as it was later discovered, insider trading as 
solely a criminal offense was not very effective, as the required proof was high, which 
may diminish the effect of this event.
 FSMA2000:  Effective  December  1,  2001.  This  law  introduced  a  civil  offense  of 
insider trading with a lower required proof than in the criminal offense and unlimited 
fines,  which should have a  negative  impact on insider trading. This is  relevant  to 
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people who think about committing insider trading because they are more likely to be 
convicted. However, based on civil offense, a person cannot be sentenced to jail, but 
still the financial and reputational risks are large.
 First enforcement of FSMA2000 (FE_FSMA2000): Conviction published February 11, 
2004. It took over two years for FSA to impose a first civil penalty for insider trading. 
This  is  a  relevant  milestone  and  sends  a  signal  that  the  new law is  enforced  in 
practice,  which  should  decrease  insider  trading  and  thus  run-ups.  However,  the 
imposed  fine  of  £15,000  was  not  very  high,  which  may  have  given  relief  to 
experienced insider traders.
 First  criminal  enforcement  of  insider  trading  by  FSA  (FCE_2009):  Conviction 
published March 27, 2009. This is the first successful criminal sentence of insider 
trading  imposed  by FSA.  This  signals  to  potential  insider  traders  that  a  criminal 
sentence is a real possibility which should have even stronger effect on decreasing 
insider  trading than the  first  enforcement  of  FSMA2000.  However,  CJA1993 was 
enforced before this case but not by FSA. The previous criminal case was from 2004.
 FSA2012:  Effective  April  1,  2013.  This  law  created  FCA with  minor  additional 
powers  on  insider  trading.  The  creation  of  FCA  was  combined  with  stricter 
communication towards insider trading. This event also coincides with increased rate 
of criminal indictments and convictions of insider trading as explained in Section 2.4, 
which could boost the effect of this event significantly.
 MAR: Effective July 3, 2016. This EU-wide law increased regulatory powers, made 
insider lists more comprehensive, and improved whistleblowing channels. Although 
MAR  does  not  specifically  tackle  insider  trading,  its  content is related  to  the 
probability of getting caught.
For the regulation changes, I use the date when the law becomes effective as the event date.  
There is usually a lag between the date when the law passes and the date it becomes effective. 
For example, FSMA2000 received a royal assent on June 14, 2000, almost one and half years 
before  it  became  effective.  The  effective  date  is  thus  predictable  to  the  market  actors. 
However, the new regulation should not change the behavior of market actors before it has 
become effective as they cannot be convicted based on the new law before the effective date. 
For ‘first enforcement events’, which are FE_FSMA2000 and FCE_2009, I use the date when 
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the successful conviction  is published.  This  date  gives  the strongest signal  to the market 
actors and is somewhat of a surprise to them, too. However, the indictment of the action has 
been  published  usually  one  to  two  year  before  the  conviction,  which  increases  the 
predictability of the event.
Figure 3 shows the median and mean run-ups over time, split to periods based on the ITR 
events. As in Table 4, the median run-up shows a decreasing trend while the trend in mean is 
not so clear. Before CJA1993, the median run-up was over 7%, after which it decreased close 
to 5%. After  FSMA2000,  it  lowered further, close to 4%, where it stayed until  FSA2012, 
when it  decreased dramatically to 2%, and after  MAR further to under 1%. Mean run-up 
increased back to 6% after FE_FSMA2000 but decreased close to median values in the end. 
Based on the figure, some ITR events might have had decreasing effect on run-ups, namely 
CJA1993, FSMA2000, FSA2012 and MAR.
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Figure 3: Mean and median run-ups split by the insider trading regulation events
The sample consists of initial merger bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 
2018  where  the  target  is  a  UK  firm  listed  in  London  Stock  Exchange  or  London  Alternative  
Investment Market. Run-up is the market model estimated cumulative abnormal return in the period 
[-42, -1] relative to the announcement date, in percentages. Variables and six insider trading regulation 
events are explained in Appendix. Each point in the graph shows the mean/median run-up within the  
period described in the x-axis. First date mentioned is the date when the insider event took place (for  
example CJA1993 became effective 1994-03-01). Number of initial bids within the period is given in 
the top of the graph.
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Table 6 is structured the same way as Table 5 in Section 4.1. In Table 6, Panel A splits the 
whole sample period into two groups based on the ITR event dates. All run-ups in post-ITR-
event periods are smaller than in pre-periods, and the differences for three latest ITR events 
are significant. For  FSA2012, the difference in the mean is significant at the 1% level. As 
FSA2012 itself  should not have the largest effect of the ITR events,  it  might be that the 
Table 6: Target run-ups by insider trading regulation events
The sample consists of initial merger bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 
2018  where  the  target  is  a  UK  firm  listed  in  London  Stock  Exchange  or  London  Alternative 
Investment Market. Run-up is the market model estimated cumulative abnormal return in the period 
[-42, -1] relative to the announcement date, in percentages. Variables are explained in Appendix. In  
this table, Panel A contains the whole sample period (1989–2018), Panel B a 504 day window around 
each insider trading regulation (ITR) event date ([-504, -1] and [+61, +564] relative to the ITR event 
date), and Panel C a 252 day window around each ITR event date ([-252, -1] and [+61, +312] relative 
to the ITR event date). In Panel B and Panel C, the pre- and post-periods do not overlap other ITR 
event  dates,  although some post-periods overlap some pre-periods,  and vice versa.  For each ITR 
event, the sample is divided into two groups. 0 is the pre-ITR-event period, 1 is the post-ITR-event 
period. diff is the difference between the mean/median run-ups of the two groups. t-test and Wilcoxon 
columns contain the p-value from the corresponding tests of the significance of the difference. Last 
two columns (N) show the distribution of initial bids based on the two groups. *, **, and *** indicate  
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Run-up, CAR [-42, -1] Mean Median N
0 1 diff t-test 0 1 diff Wilcoxon 0 1
Panel A: 1989–2018
CJA1993, 1994-03-01 7.36 5.48 -1.88 0.33 7.30 4.08 -3.22 0.29 35 662
FSMA2000, 2001-12-01 6.04 5.10 -0.94 0.23 5.33 3.02 -2.32 0.26 355 342
FE_FSMA2000, 2004-02-11 5.82 5.23 -0.59 0.46 4.93 2.92 -2.01 0.35 407 290
FCE_2009, 2009-03-27 5.91 4.44 -1.47 0.10* 4.75 2.19 -2.55 0.09* 538 159
FSA2012, 2013-04-01 5.95 3.11 -2.84 0.003*** 4.72 1.68 -3.04 0.02** 605 92
MAR, 2016-07-03 5.74 2.93 -2.81 0.06* 4.38 0.84 -3.53 0.09* 656 41
Panel B: 504-day window
CJA1993, 1994-03-01 3.49 5.15 1.67 0.61 2.12 2.95 0.83 0.63 19 28
FSMA2000, 2001-12-01 5.23 4.22 -1.01 0.53 4.15 4.33 0.18 0.83 102 48
FE_FSMA2000, 2004-02-11 4.33 7.94 3.61 0.05** 4.50 4.72 0.22 0.17 47 56
FCE_2009, 2009-03-27 3.96 7.03 3.07 0.26 2.58 2.91 0.33 0.35 43 36
FSA2012, 2013-04-01 5.81 2.88 -2.93 0.23 4.49 1.36 -3.12 0.38 31 29
MAR, 2016-07-03 2.77 1.74 -1.03 0.54 1.68 0.27 -1.41 0.54 44 36
Panel C: 252-day window
CJA1993, 1994-03-01 -2.11 4.04 6.15 0.19 -3.17 2.88 6.05 0.41 7 9
FSMA2000, 2001-12-01 5.94 2.37 -3.57 0.11 6.48 4.11 -2.37 0.13 26 23
FE_FSMA2000, 2004-02-11 6.55 6.90 0.35 0.90 5.50 3.90 -1.60 0.94 25 28
FCE_2009, 2009-03-27 5.37 5.99 0.62 0.87 6.80 3.79 -3.01 0.83 18 21
FSA2012, 2013-04-01 8.69 4.17 -4.52 0.32 7.66 2.79 -4.87 0.27 18 6
MAR, 2016-07-03 3.03 1.12 -1.91 0.48 1.98 -0.75 -2.73 0.46 21 19
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increased rate of criminal convictions amplifies the effect. Because this analysis considers the 
full sample period and the variables split the sample by time, any decreasing trend in run-ups 
may give significance to the ITR events, even when the trend would be caused by something 
else. Also, market players may find new ways to go around insider trading regulation after 
some time, so the effects of regulation may diminish. To tackle this problem, Panel B and 
Panel C use a window around the ITR event date to separate the effect of the specific ITR 
event. Panel B contains all initial bids announced in  windows [-504, -1] and [+61, +564] 
relative to the ITR event date; Panel C all initial bids announced in [-252, -1] and [+61, +312] 
relative to the ITR event date. All days are trading days. The 60-trading-day gap after the ITR 
event date exists so that the run-up periods of the post-window initial bids do not overlap 
with the pre-windows. In Panel B, pre- and post-windows of one event do not overlap with 
other ITR event dates. In Panel C, in addition, the pre- and post-windows of one event do not 
overlap with other pre- and post-windows, either.
In  Table  6,  Panel  B,  the  only  significant  result  is  when  means  of  FE_FSMA2000 are 
compared. The difference is, surprisingly, positive, which might be caused by outliers, as the 
difference in medians is not significant. However, as speculated before, the lenient fines by 
FSA could have had an opposite effect than anticipated. Panel C tells a similar story to Panel 
B  and  no  ITR  event  is  significant.  However,  looking  at  the  results  for  FSMA2000 is 
interesting. In Panel C, the event is close to being significant with high effect, -3.57%. In 
Panel B with wider window, the effect decreases, and with full  period,  it  decreases even 
further. Could it be that  FSMA2000 did defer insider trading immediately after becoming 
effective,  but  when market  players  noticed  that  it  is  not  being  enforced,  they  continued 
insider trading as before?
Figure  4  plots  the  ITR events  from Table  6,  Panel  C to  separate  graphs  and shows the 
development of the CARs until 5 days after the deal announcement day. The shown run-up is 
a median daily CAR, starting from 42 days before the announcement day of the initial bid, 
and the day  -1 is highlighted with a red dotted line. Mean daily CARs are not materially 
different (unreported). After CJA1993, run-ups were actually a little bit higher, and the deal 
premium was over 10 percentage points lower.  FSMA2000,  MAR, and  FCE_2009 seem to 
have decreased the run-ups. FSA2012 has the largest difference in run-up. With FSA2012, it 
should be noted that the deal premium is also a lot lower, which could indicate that the deals 
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Figure 4: Median daily CARs before and after the insider trading regulation event
CAR is market model estimated cumulative abnormal return. The sample consists of initial merger 
bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 2018 where the target is a UK firm listed 
in  London  Stock  Exchange  or  London  Alternative  Investment  Market.  Variables  and  six  insider 
trading  regulation  events  are  explained  in  Appendix.  All  days  are  trading  days.  Dotted  red  line  
highlights the last day before the announcement of the bid, i.e. the day -1. Number of initial bids  
within the pre- and post-periods is given in the top of each graph. Pre period includes bids announced 
in the window [-252, -1], and Post period bids announced in the window [+61, +312], relative to the 
insider trading regulation event date. Insider trading regulation event date is given after the name of  
the event in the title of each graph.
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are materially different between pre- and post-periods. The number of deals, six, is also quite 
low.
Based on the univariate analysis of run-ups around the ITR events, some of the events might 
have an effect on run-ups, with FSA2012 and MAR having the strongest effects. However, the 
deals before and after the ITR event may be different from each other. That is why next, I 
consider the market anticipation factors together with the ITR events.
4.3. Multivariate analysis
To analyze the effects of ITR events and deal anticipation factors together over time, I use a 
regression model similar to Dutordoir et al.  (2018) and Brigida and Madura (2012). First, I 
examine whether there is a trend in the run-ups. Then, I try to explain the trend with market 
anticipation factors. After this, I add ITR event dummies and see how they affect the trend 
and  if they  can  explain  it.  I  also  examine  the  ITR  events  individually  with  the  market 
anticipation factors.  Finally,  for robustness,  I  add deal premiums as control variables and 
include only deals with UK acquirers.
The results from the regression analysis are in Table 7. In the first column, I regress run-ups 
only on the market anticipation factors. The results are similar to the univariate analysis in 
Table 5. Number of bidders is significant and positive, and Hostile deals incur lower run-ups 
as  do  targets  listed  in  LSE.  In  contrast  to  the  univariate  analysis,  Dividend  yield is  not 
significant anymore.  Active industry is  close to being significant and becomes significant 
with a negative coefficient in subsequent regressions. So, when there has been a bid within a 
year  in  the  target’s  4-code  SIC  industry,  the  run-up  is  lower.  This  is  somewhat 
counterintuitive, as mergers in the same industry might help investors to predict new mergers, 
which would lead to higher run-up. However, the increase in stock prices can incur before the 
run-up period begins, and so the stock price is already high, and the market model returns 
within the run-up period can even be negative. Finally,  Sales growth is significant with a 
positive coefficient. This is contrary to the hypothesis. The reason may be that growing firms 
are attractive merger targets.
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Table 7: OLS regressions examining the trend in run-ups
The sample consists of initial bids for a majority share of target’s equity between 1989 and 2018 
where the target is a UK firm listed in London Stock Exchange or London Alternative Investment  
Market. Run-up is the market model estimated cumulative abnormal return in the period [-42, -1]  
relative  to  the  announcement  date,  in  percentages.  Variables  are  explained  in  Appendix.  In  first 
column, the run-up is regressed on the market anticipation factors, and in second column, only on 
trend. In third column, trend  with market anticipation factors are included, and in fourth column, 
trend with insider trading event dummies. In fifth column all factors are included. Columns from 6 to 
11 examine the effect of individual insider trading events together with the market anticipation factors 
and trend. t-statistics are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,  
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Run-up, CAR [-42, -1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Trend -0.10* 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.04 -0.01 -0.16 0.11 0.17* 0.09
(-1.73) (0.55) (0.60) (0.77) (0.46) (-0.05) (-1.35) (0.98) (1.78) (1.16)
Rumored 0.45 0.53 0.68 0.51 0.65 1.25 0.43 0.52 0.51
(0.44) (0.52) (0.59) (0.49) (0.62) (1.16) (0.42) (0.51) (0.50)
Deal completed -1.17 -1.18 -1.41 -1.23 -1.09 -1.03 -1.22 -1.28 -1.35
(-0.96) (-0.98) (-1.12) (-0.99) (-0.89) (-0.85) (-1.00) (-1.06) (-1.11)
Number of 2.50** 2.51** 2.52** 2.51** 2.47** 2.47** 2.48** 2.47** 2.46**
  bidders (2.42) (2.44) (2.44) (2.44) (2.39) (2.40) (2.41) (2.41) (2.39)
Toehold 1.25 1.38 1.54 1.42 1.39 1.30 1.49 1.58 1.51
(1.21) (1.30) (1.43) (1.31) (1.31) (1.23) (1.39) (1.49) (1.42)
Cash financing -0.88 -0.96 -1.66 -0.98 -1.05 -1.28 -1.23 -1.44 -1.21
(-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.75) (-0.44) (-0.48) (-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.65) (-0.55)
Hostile -2.30 -2.43* -2.52* -2.45* -2.36* -2.44* -2.44* -2.36* -2.41*
(-1.64) (-1.71) (-1.76) (-1.72) (-1.66) (-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.67) (-1.70)
LBO -0.31 -0.23 -0.42 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22 -0.28 -0.32 -0.37
(-0.24) (-0.17) (-0.32) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.21) (-0.24) (-0.28)
Public 0.48 0.57 0.43 0.58 0.56 0.47 0.58 0.56 0.46
(0.48) (0.56) (0.42) (0.56) (0.55) (0.46) (0.56) (0.55) (0.45)
Foreign -0.16 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.08
(-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.18) (-0.09)
No. of target 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.31
  advisors (0.76) (0.72) (0.79) (0.72) (0.74) (0.84) (0.77) (0.69) (0.76)
No. of acquirer -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
  advisors (-0.42) (-0.47) (-0.48) (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.47)
Active industry -1.34 -1.32 -1.51* -1.34 -1.34 -1.38* -1.42* -1.42* -1.43*
(-1.61) (-1.58) (-1.79) (-1.59) (-1.60) (-1.66) (-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.71)
LSE 1.90 2.04* 2.34* 2.04* 2.05* 2.23* 2.02* 2.20* 2.18*
(1.59) (1.67) (1.90) (1.67) (1.68) (1.83) (1.65) (1.80) (1.78)
Firm value -0.48 -0.49 -0.51 -0.49 -0.50 -0.55* -0.51 -0.46 -0.48
(-1.44) (-1.48) (-1.52) (-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.67) (-1.52) (-1.38) (-1.44)
Market-to-book -0.25 -0.24 -0.26 -0.25 -0.24 -0.26 -0.26 -0.23 -0.23
(-0.90) (-0.88) (-0.92) (-0.89) (-0.86) (-0.94) (-0.92) (-0.83) (-0.85)
Dividend yield 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.28* 0.25 0.26 0.26
(1.35) (1.45) (1.60) (1.44) (1.52) (1.73) (1.50) (1.57) (1.59)
Sales growth 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05**
(1.86) (1.92) (1.89) (1.92) (1.91) (1.93) (1.93) (1.83) (1.97)
Leverage 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.34) (0.39) (0.30) (0.40) (0.38) (0.27) (0.38) (0.37) (0.42)
Liquidity -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(-0.71) (-0.73) (-0.87) (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.81) (-0.69) (-0.86) (-0.72)
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The second column includes only a yearly time trend which is negative and significant. The 
value of -0.10% means that over the sample period from 1989 to 2018, the median run-up has 
decreased in total 3.00% due to ‘trend’ when no other variables are considered. Same way as 
Dutordoir et al.  (2018), I aim to explain the negative time trend in run-ups first with the 
market anticipation factors and then add the ITR event dummies, which equal zero before and 
one after the event,  to see what effect they have on the time trend. In column three,  the 
market anticipation factors are added, and they make the time trend insignificant and close to 
zero. This indicates that the market anticipation factors can explain the time trend without the 
ITR event dummies.
Column  four  includes  the  time  trend  with  ITR  event  dummies,  without  the  market 
anticipation  factors. The trend increases to positive and becomes insignificant, so it seems 
both the market anticipation factors and the ITR events can explain the time trend. In column 
five, I include both the market anticipation factors and ITR events with a time trend. The time 
trend increases to 0.24%, which indicates that the model lacks some other factors that could 
explain the positive time trend, although the time trend stays insignificant.
GR dummy 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.89
(1.00) (0.97) (0.93) (0.97) (0.97) (0.95) (0.96) (0.99) (0.95)
CJA1993 -2.66 -1.03 0.35
  1994-03-01 (-0.98) (-0.37) (0.17)
FSMA2000 -2.22 -2.61 0.80
  2001-12-01 (-1.14) (-1.28) (0.55)
FE_FSMA2000 1.23 2.83 3.52**
  2004-02-11 (0.62) (1.32) (2.14)
FCE_2009 -0.74 -1.27 -1.42
  2009-03-27 (-0.36) (-0.58) (-0.82)
FSA2012 -3.69 -3.03 -3.52**
  2013-04-01 (-1.63) (-1.30) (-2.07)
MAR -0.75 -1.47 -2.86
  2016-07-03 (-0.33) (-0.62) (-1.43)
Constant 3.90 7.04*** 3.07 6.84*** 2.49 2.84 3.31 4.60 2.65 1.87 2.53
(1.36) (7.53) (0.95) (3.49) (0.69) (0.81) (1.01) (1.39) (0.81) (0.57) (0.78)
Observations 697 697 697 697 697 697 697 697 697 697 697
R2 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
F Statistic 1.45* 2.98* 1.40 1.19 1.38* 1.33 1.34 1.55* 1.36 1.53* 1.43*
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Looking  at  the  ITR  event  variables  in  columns  four  and  five,  no  event  is  significant. 
Coefficients and  t-statistics of ITR event dummies are similar to the results  of univariate 
analysis in Section 4.2. In columns six to eleven, I have included ITR event dummies one by 
one to the regression. FSA2012 is negative and significant which might be partly a result of 
the increased criminal enforcement by FSA/FCA as the event itself should not have such a 
large effect. Counterintuitively,  FE_FSMA2000 is significant and has a positive coefficient. 
As speculated in Section 4.2, this could be due to low fines that were given. Overall, it seems 
that the ITR events have affected the level of run-ups over time, although most of them are 
not significant and thus it is not possible to be conclusive.
Table 8 contains robustness tests to further examine the factors affecting the trend in run-ups. 
First six columns examine the effect of mark-up  on run-ups. As discussed in Section 3.2, 
Schwert (1996) introduces a deal anticipation theory, a possibility that the run-up is affected 
by the deal premium, with a higher premium tempting a potential insider trader due to higher 
potential gains. Betton et al. (2014) support this theory, too. So, the trend and variance in the 
run-up might be due to changes in the mark-up, although the preliminary analysis in Section 
3.2 did not support this. In columns one to three, I use Mark-up, 1d as the mark-up measure 
which is the share price on day +1 divided by the share price on day -1. First column shows 
that the trend becomes insignificant but is almost at the same level as without the mark-up 
variable, so the mark-up variable cannot explain the trend in the run-ups very well. Adding 
the  market  anticipation factors  diminishes  the  trend,  and adding the  ITR event  dummies 
increases the trend further, just as in Table 7.
Columns four to six use the CAR over the bid announcement day and the next day as the 
mark-up measure, so the return is market model adjusted (which  Mark-up, 1d is not). The 
results regarding the trend are nearly identical to columns one to three. Changes in the level 
of mark-ups cannot explain the trend in the run-up. The coefficients of the mark-up variables 
are positive and significant at the 1% level with a coefficient ranging from -0.18% to -0.28%. 
This does not support the deal anticipation theory in the first place, because the run-up and 
the mark-up should be positively correlated according to it. Instead, this is in line with the 
markup hypothesis, as the increase in mark-up is not compensated at a ratio of one-to-one in 
run-up.
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Table 8: OLS regressions examining the trend in run-ups, robustness
This table introduces two robustness tests. The sample consists of initial bids for a majority share of 
target’s  equity  between  1989  and  2018  where  the  target  is  a  UK  firm  listed  in  London  Stock 
Exchange  or  London  Alternative  Investment  Market.  Run-up  is  the  market  model  estimated 
cumulative abnormal return in the period [-42, -1] relative to the announcement date, in percentages. 
Variables  are  explained  in  Appendix.  In  columns  one  to  six,  mark-ups  are  added as  a  potential 
explanation  to  run-ups. Mark-up,  1d is  calculated  as  the  target  share  price  1  day  after  the  bid 
announcement  day divided by the share price 1 day before the bid announcement  day, minus one. 
CAR [0, +1] is the market model estimated cumulative abnormal return on days 0 and +1 relative to  
the  bid  announcement  day. In  columns  seven  to  nine,  deals  with  foreign  bidders  are  excluded. 
Variables  are  explained  in  Appendix.  t-statistics  are  in  the  parentheses.  *,  **,  and  ***  indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
 Run-up, CAR [-42, -1]
Full sample No foreign bidders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trend -0.07 0.04 0.27 -0.10* -0.01 0.20 -0.22*** -0.09 0.51
(-1.29) (0.62) (0.91) (-1.77) (-0.20) (0.66) (-2.61) (-0.90) (0.94)
Mark-up, 1d -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.22***
(-8.35) (-9.53) (-9.65)
CAR [0, +1] -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.28***
(-7.27) (-7.78) (-7.99)
Rumored -0.40 -0.31 -0.26 -0.10 -0.67 -2.21
(-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.09) (-0.39) (-1.15)
Deal completed -0.37 -0.51 -0.50 -0.63 -1.08 -1.94
(-0.32) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.94)
Number of bidders 2.93*** 3.06*** 2.73*** 2.85*** 4.35** 4.12**
(3.03) (3.16) (2.77) (2.89) (2.41) (2.26)
Toehold 1.04 1.01 0.99 0.95 1.33 2.06
(1.04) (0.99) (0.97) (0.91) (0.81) (1.22)
Cash financing 0.99 0.82 0.62 0.40 -5.89 -5.70
(0.48) (0.39) (0.29) (0.19) (-1.36) (-1.30)
Hostile -2.46* -2.55* -2.67* -2.77** -5.04** -5.35***
(-1.84) (-1.90) (-1.96) (-2.02) (-2.53) (-2.66)
LBO -0.59 -0.69 -0.59 -0.72 -0.88 -1.51
(-0.48) (-0.55) (-0.47) (-0.57) (-0.32) (-0.54)
Public 1.11 1.04 1.07 0.97 1.05 1.10
(1.15) (1.08) (1.09) (0.99) (0.70) (0.71)
Foreign -1.02 -1.02 -0.67 -0.66
(-1.19) (-1.19) (-0.77) (-0.76)
Number of 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.53 0.47
  target advisors (1.06) (0.99) (1.00) (0.96) (0.87) (0.77)
Number of -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.68 -0.65
  acquirer advisors (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-1.49) (-1.39)
Active industry -2.27*** -2.30*** -2.21*** -2.27*** -0.88 -1.28
(-2.87) (-2.88) (-2.73) (-2.79) (-0.64) (-0.91)
LSE 2.08* 2.38** 1.60 1.92 3.16 3.49*
(1.81) (2.07) (1.36) (1.64) (1.55) (1.68)
Firm value -0.99*** -0.98*** -0.64** -0.63* -0.37 -0.31
(-3.13) (-3.08) (-2.00) (-1.96) (-0.70) (-0.57)
Market-to-book -0.30 -0.29 -0.18 -0.16 -0.43 -0.52
(-1.13) (-1.10) (-0.66) (-0.61) (-1.01) (-1.21)
Dividend yield 0.21 0.20 0.08 0.07 -0.09 -0.14
(1.39) (1.29) (0.52) (0.46) (-0.34) (-0.51)
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Adding the mark-up variables to the regression has some effects on the ITR events. FSA2012 
and  FSMA2000 become significant with negative coefficients, while other ITR events stay 
insignificant.  Market anticipation factors are similar to Table 7 except that  Firm value is 
significant and implies that higher market value of the target decreases the run-up. This might 
be  due to  the  hypothesis  that  smaller  firms  are  more  likely  to  be  acquired  and thus  the 
acquisitions could be predicted, but the reason may also be that the stocks of larger firms are 
more liquid and so the effect of increased demand for the stock does not show in the price as 
much as for smaller firms.
Columns seven to nine include only initial bids where the acquirer is from the UK. Many US 
studies, such as Dutordoir et al. (2018), have used this as a sample selection criteria, which is 
more feasible to do in the US than in the UK due to higher number of acquisitions. Changes 
in the UK insider trading regulation may have larger effect on acquisitions where all parties 
are from the UK and thus under more intense monitoring by the  regulators. This criterion 
Sales growth 0.05* 0.04* 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06 0.06
(1.88) (1.75) (2.73) (2.66) (1.50) (1.57)
Leverage -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.07
(-0.15) (-0.26) (-0.43) (-0.57) (1.06) (1.44)
Liquidity -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06
(-1.14) (-1.44) (-0.93) (-1.21) (-1.00) (-0.76)
GR dummy 0.75 0.74 0.82 0.80 1.07 0.99
(0.85) (0.85) (0.92) (0.90) (0.70) (0.64)
CJA1993 -1.82 -2.01 2.80
  1994-03-01 (-0.69) (-0.75) (0.55)
FSMA2000 -3.70* -3.82* -4.15
  2001-12-01 (-1.93) (-1.96) (-1.14)
FE_FSMA2000 2.48 2.98 -1.55
  2004-02-11 (1.23) (1.45) (-0.42)
FCE_2009 0.78 0.70 -2.73
  2009-03-27 (0.38) (0.33) (-0.80)
FSA2012 -4.93** -4.70** -1.73
  2013-04-01 (-2.24) (-2.09) (-0.51)
MAR 0.22 -0.48 -3.90
  2016-07-03 (0.10) (-0.21) (-1.24)
Constant 12.05*** 10.39*** 10.34*** 11.98*** 9.74*** 10.01*** 8.90*** 7.21 -0.05
(11.21) (3.31) (2.96) (10.61) (3.02) (2.79) (5.86) (1.36) (-0.01)
Observations 697 697 697 697 697 697 301 301 301
R2 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.12
F Statistic 36.54*** 5.64*** 4.84*** 28.03*** 4.20*** 3.74*** 6.79*** 1.65** 1.46*
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more than halves the sample size from 697 to 301. The results stay largely similar to prior 
results. In column seven, the trend is -0.22% and significant at the 1% level, which is larger 
in  magnitude  and  significance  than  before.  In  column  eight,  when  adding  the  market 
anticipation  factors,  the  trend  disappears.  In  column  nine,  when  adding  the  ITR  event 
dummies, the trend increases to 0.51% while staying insignificant.  FE_FSMA2000 is now 
negative, although not even close to being significant. None of the ITR event dummies are 
significant, which can be caused by small sample size.
In unreported tests, I limit the sample to initial bids announced after 1994 to exclude the first 
years with fewer observations. This does not change the results for trend, market anticipation 
factors, or ITR events.
The  multivariate analysis  suggests that following market anticipation factors  correlate with 
lower run-up: Hostile, Active industry, Firm value, Mark-up 1d. In contrast, following factors 
correlate  with higher  run-up:  Number of bidders,  LSE, Dividend yield, and Sales growth. 
Regarding ITR events, there is support that  FSA2012 and  FSMA2000 have decreased the 
run-ups, while the others are not significant. Finally, the mark-ups are not driving the trend in 
the run-ups, and a large share of the foreign bidders cannot explain the results, either.
5. Discussion of the results and limitations of the study
In this section, I discuss the results, the limitations of my paper, and potential avenues for 
future research. In Section 3.2, I  find a decreasing trend in the run-ups in the UK over my 
sample period from 1989 to 2018. Then, I analyze the effects of market anticipation factors 
and ITR events on the run-ups separately. Finally, in the multivariate analysis, I  study the 
effects of market anticipation factors and ITR events together. I find that market anticipation 
factors can explain the decreasing trend in run-ups, although adding the ITR events amplify 
the effect. Of the six ITR events, only FSA2012 is consistently significant.
Results  for  the  market  anticipation  factors  emphasize  the  importance  of keeping  the 
information  related  to  the  deal  secure.  As  hostile  deals  incur  lower  run-ups  and  higher 
number of bidders incur higher run-ups, it seems that the information leakage is a large part 
of the causes for run-ups. Together with run-ups being an added cost to the bidder, this can 
create conflicting interests relating to the deal information leakage, because the sell-side party 
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may want to leak the information to increase its share price and attract more bidders and thus 
achieve a higher deal price, whereas the acquirer prefers to keep the information secret in all 
cases.  Other  than that,  it  is  difficult  to  draw conclusions from the results  for  the market 
anticipation factors.
Of the six ITR events, FSA2012 has the strongest impact. As speculated before, instead of the 
regulation change, the main reason for the decreased run-ups after FSA2012 may relate to the 
increased criminal indictment and conviction rate of FSA/FCA as presented in Section 2.4 
and in Table 2. Previous research such as Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) has found that the 
enforcement of the law matters more than the law itself, and it can be that in the UK, only the 
significantly increased enforcement activity started working as a deterrence to insider traders. 
I also  find some support for the FSMA2000 to have impacted the run-ups. This would be 
feasible  as  the  introduction  of  the  civil  offense  should  have  made  it  easier  to  achieve 
successful  insider  trading  convictions.  Interestingly,  the  first  enforcement  of  FSMA2000 
(FE_FSMA2000) has a positive coefficient in the analysis. It could be due to the low fines 
given by the UK regulator which gave relief to potential insider traders or just an artifact in 
the data.
Studying the effect of the changes in insider trading regulation is complicated, although the 
mechanism through which tighter insider trading regulation would diminish the amount of 
insider  trading  seems  at  first  glance  straightforward.  As  an  example,  let  us  consider 
FSMA2000 which  should  be  a  major  tightening  of the  regulation  by  introducing a  civil 
offense of insider trading. First, for it to be effective, people are required to get caught. So, if 
the insider traders are clever and can avoid getting caught, they may continue just as before. 
Even if they are caught, they might be able to settle the case early for small fines, which does  
not have a large deterrence effect. These types of considerations are applicable to all of the 
events.  So,  in  the  end,  the  level  of  enforcement  intensity is  what  finally  matters,  and it 
depends on the regulatory agency, its budget and other resources, the management, and the 
culture in the country. This is a potential area for future research in the UK. Del Guercio et al. 
(2017) study the enforcement intensity of SEC in the US through the level of budget and 
number  of  staff  positions  and  find  that  high  intensity  deters  insider  trading.  In  the  US, 
Dutordoir et al.  (2018) found a clear effect of five insider trading regulation changes on the 
run-ups. It could be that because SEC and Department of Justice are strong regulators in the 
US, regulation changes have had stronger effects there than in the UK.
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Finally, something totally different from the variables used in this paper might have affected 
the trend in run-ups, such as technological advancements or changed trading patterns. They 
are especially relevant from the point of views of insider trading and information leakage. 
Electronic chats,  easier  access to markets,  faster  and more secure information flows, and 
increased automatic monitoring by the regulators all relate to run-ups. Although the automatic 
monitoring and detecting of abnormal trades have improved, it is difficult to say whether they 
can catch the sophisticated traders who adjust their trading to hide the abnormality  (Ahern, 
2018), and who are on average three links away from the source of the information (Ahern, 
2017).
There are also some other limitations in this paper. As discussed in Section 3.1, the data about 
the initial bids is not without errors. The announcement dates are not manually checked and 
SDC is known to sometimes have  inaccurate data  (Mulherin and Simsir, 2015). Related to 
this, the run-up period can include other abnormal events, such as earnings surprises, which 
would distort the run-up measure. Although the errors affect the run-up both positively and 
negatively and thus on average be zero, they add noise to the data and thus diminish the 
explanatory power of the variables. Also,  all deals in my sample are not typical mergers or 
acquisitions  with  a  clear  control  premium  which  also  adds  noise.  Finally,  the  data 
requirements  for  calculating  the  market  anticipation  proxies  decrease  the  sample  size 
significantly.
6. Conclusion
My thesis is the first comprehensive look on the development of run-ups in the UK from 
1989 to 2018, combining the effects of market anticipation factors with the effects of changes 
in  the  insider  trading  regulation.  There  are  two reasons  why understanding  the  size  and 
sources of the run-up is important. First, the run-up is mostly an added cost to the bidder, and 
second, a large part of the run-up is due to illegal insider trading. I find that the run-ups have 
decreased from 1989 to 2019 on average 0.10 percentage points per year with a  median 
run-up being 4.14% over  the whole period.  Full  deal  period returns  have decreased at  a 
similar rate, which supports the hypothesis that the run-up is an added cost to the bidder.
My results show that the decline in the run-ups can be explained by both market anticipation 
factors and changes in the insider trading regulation. Moreover, changes in the level of deal 
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mark-ups are not driving the decline. Of the six insider trading regulation events analyzed in 
this  paper, Financial  Services Act 2012 (FSA2012) has had the most significant effect.  It 
coincides with increased insider trading criminal indictment and conviction activity by the 
UK regulator, which may explain the strong effect, as the regulation change itself was not 
radical.  Studying  the  relation  of  insider  trading  regulation  enforcement  intensity  and the 
run-ups would be a logical next step in the insider trading research in the UK, similar to what 
Del Guercio et al. (2017) have studied in the US.
FCA, the UK regulator, has been under a lot of criticism for low enforcement activity despite 
continuous indications of high level of insider trading since the inception of its predecessor 
FSA in 2001.  My thesis  suggests that FCA has finally responded to the criticism and its 
higher enforcement activity during recent years has lowered the amount of insider trading.
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Appendix: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Date announced 
(DA)
‘The date one or more parties involved in the transaction makes the first  
public disclosure of common or unilateral intent to pursue the transaction 
(no formal agreement is required). Among other things, Date Announced is 
determined by the disclosure of discussions between parties, disclosure of a 
unilateral  approach  made  by  a  potential  bidder,  and  the  disclosure  of  a 
signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other agreement.’ – SDC 
definition. SDC data item: DA
Original date 
announced (ODA)
‘The date when the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible 
takeover  candidate.  ODA is used for the  calculation of  stock premiums. 
When multiple bidders exist, the ODA is recorded in the following cases:  
(1) If acquirer changes from ‘Seeking Buyer’ or ‘Undisclosed Acquirer’ to 
an actual entity; (2) Competing bids are announced; (3) Competing stakes 
are announced; (4) A defensive transaction is announced.’ – SDC definition. 
SDC data item: DAO
Active industry A dummy variable that equals one if there was another confirmed bid within 
12 months in the four-digit SIC code industry of the target firm, and zero 
otherwise.  The  variable  is  manually  constructed  based  on  the  deal 
information in SDC.
Foreign A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate parent of the acquirer is 
not from the UK, and zero otherwise. SDC data item: AUPNAT
Public A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate parent of the acquirer is 
public, and zero otherwise. SDC data item: AUPPUB
Deal completed A dummy variable that equals one if the deal is completed, regardless of 
whether the eventual acquirer is the first one to bid. Bids announced within 
12 months from the first  bid are considered.  Original  date announced is 
used. The dummy is manually constructed. SDC data item: STAT
Hostile A dummy variable that equals one if the deal is considered hostile, and zero 
otherwise. SDC data item: UNSOLICITED
LBO A dummy variable that equals one if the deal is considered to be a LBO 
type, and zero otherwise. SDC data item: LBO
Number of bidders Number of bidders according to the SDC data. SDC data item: BIDCOUNT
Rumored A dummy  variable  that  equals  one  if  the  deal  was  rumored,  and  zero 
otherwise. SDC data item: RUM
Toehold A dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer owned any shares in the 
target before the bid, and zero otherwise. SDC data item: PHDA
Dividend yield Dividend  yield  ratio  of  the  target  12  weeks  before  the  original 
announcement date. Datastream code: DY
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GR dummy Growth-resource  mismatch.  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  for 
combinations  of:  a)  above-average  growth,  below-average  liquidity,  and 
above-average  leverage,  and  b)  below-average  growth,  above-average 
liquidity,  and below-average leverage,  and zero otherwise.  Definitions of 
sales  growth,  liquidity,  and leverage  are  in  this  Appendix.  Data  is  from 
Worldscope.
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets. Data is from Worldscope.
Liquidity Ratio of cash and equivalent to total assets. Data is from Worldscope.
LSE A dummy variable that equals one if the target is listed in the London Stock 
Exchange, and zero if it is listed in London Alternative Investment Market  
(AIM). AIM was established in 1995. SDC data item: TAEXCHC
Market-to-book Market value of equity to book value of equity 12 weeks before the original 
date announced. Datastream code: MV
Number of target 
advisors
Total  number  of  target  advisors,  summing  legal  and  financial  advisors 
together. SDC data items: TACOUNT, NUMTLEG
Number of acquirer 
advisors
Total number of acquirer  advisors,  summing legal and financial  advisors 
together. SDC data items: AACOUNT, NUMALEG
Sales growth Three-year average sales growth, calculated by dividing the sales last year 
with the sales three years before. Data is from Worldscope.
Firm value Natural  logarithm of the market value of the target  12 weeks before the 
original date announced. Datastream code: MTBV
Cash financing Natural logarithm of one plus the percentage of cash used of the deal value. 
SDC data item: PCT_CASH
Premium, 8w Target share price 1 day after  the bid announcement  day divided by the 
share price 42 days before the bid announcement day, minus one. All days 
are trading days.
Mark-up, 1d Target share price 1 day after  the bid announcement  day divided by the 
share price 1 day before the bid announcement day, minus one. All days are 
trading days.
Run-up The target  run-up measure  is  calculated as  a cumulative sum of  market 
model  estimated abnormal stock returns, following standard methods (e.g. 
Dutordoir et al.,  2018). The market model regression is estimated over a 
period of -255 days to -70 days relative to the deal announcement date. I  
use FTSE All Share index as a market portfolio. I calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) as a cumulative sum of abnormal returns within the 
run-up period. My main target run-up measure is CAR over 42 trading days 
before the announcement date, i.e. [-42, -1].
Deal value Total  value  of  consideration  paid  by  the  acquirer  including  equity  and 
liabilities and excluding fees and expenses. SDC data item: HOSTVALUE
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Trend Trend is calculated as the number of calendars days between the ODA and 
1988-12-31 divided by 365, scaling the trend to a yearly number.
Trend=ODA −1988-12-31
365
CJA1993
(1994-03-01)
Criminal Justice Act 1993, effective March 1, 1994. Extended the basis of 
liability for the criminal insider dealing offense with a broader definition of  
‘securities’ and ‘insider’ than before. A dummy variable that equals one for 
deals with an announcement date after this insider trading regulation event 
date, and zero otherwise.
FSMA2000
(2001-12-01)
Financial  Services  and  Markets  Act  2000,  effective  December  1,  2001. 
Introduced a civil offense of insider trading with unlimited fines based on 
‘balance of probabilities’. A dummy variable that equals one for deals with 
an announcement date after this insider trading regulation event date, and 
zero otherwise.
FE_FSMA2000
(2004-02-11)
First enforcement of FSMA2000 (civil  penalty) by FSA on February 11, 
2004. A dummy variable that equals one for deals with an announcement 
date after this insider trading regulation event date, and zero otherwise.
FCE_2009
(2009-03-27)
First successful criminal sentence by Financial Services Authority (FSA) on 
March  27,  2009.  A dummy  variable  that  equals  one  for  deals  with  an 
announcement date after this insider trading regulation event date, and zero 
otherwise.
FSA2012
(2013-04-01)
Financial Services Act 2012, effective April 1, 2013. Divided FSA into two 
entities and created Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  FCA was given 
only minor additional powers. A dummy variable that equals one for deals 
with an announcement date after this insider trading regulation event date, 
and zero otherwise.
MAR
(2016-07-03)
Market  Abuse  Regulation,  effective  July  3,  2016.  Gave  regulators  more 
power to monitor insider trading and also improved whistle blowing and 
insider  lists.  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  for  deals  with  an 
announcement date after this insider trading regulation event date, and zero 
otherwise.
IT event A dummy variable that equals one for deals announced in the window of 
[+61, +312] related to any of the insider trading regulation events, and zero 
for deals announced in the window of [-252, -1], and NA otherwise. The 
periods  related  to  insider  trading  regulation  events  do  not  overlap  each 
other.
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